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Symposium
Fighting Terrorism with Torture:
Where To Draw the Line?
_______________
“Torture Lite,” “Full Bodied” Torture, and the
Insulation of Legal Conscience
Seth F. Kreimer*
INTRODUCTION
Several years ago, I began work on a project that I fancied to be both
hypothetical and academic. In the aftermath of September 11, a number of
commentators, including one prominent member of the legal academy,
advanced the proposition that interrogation by torture in pursuit of terrorists
should be viewed as permissible under the United States Constitution when
undertaken with procedural safeguards.1 In an article published in 2003, I
argued that these commentators were legally sloppy and morally obtuse: no
matter what procedures accompany it, interrogation by torture is both at odds
with settled constitutional law as it is and profoundly inconsistent with the
legal system as it should be.2

*
Kenneth W. Gemmill Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. This
paper has benefitted from the fine research assistance of Mihir Kshirsagar, as well as the very
helpful comments of Marty Lederman, Sandy Levinson, John Parry, and Kim Scheppele. Each
of these individuals deserves my profound thanks. None of them deserves responsibility for
mistakes that have survived their assistance. This article is based on a presentation made at the
January 2005 annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools. Since that time, a
significant amount of information has emerged about the evolution of the current
administration’s policies regarding interrogation of detainees. While that information has not
been incorporated into the account provided here, the subsequent revelations support the analysis
of this article. For one especially revealing narrative of the internal legal discussions, see
Memorandum for Inspector General, Dept. of the Navy, from Alberto J. Mora, Statement for the
Record: Office of General Counsel Involvement in Interrogation Issues, July 7, 2004, available
at http://www.newyorker.com/images/pdfs/moramemo.pdf.
1. See, e.g., ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE
THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE (2002).
2. Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: Constitutional Constraints on
Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 278 (2003). The legal discussion in part III,
below, is adapted from that article. In a response to my article, Professor Dershowitz appeared
to concede that a fair application of constitutional doctrine would preclude torture, and he simply
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At the time, I was suspicious that the Bush administration’s disavowals of
torture were a bit too carefully worded to be taken at face value. Still, I
experienced a mild sense of paranoia when I suggested that a sufficiently
unscrupulous lawyer could argue that a differentiation between “cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment” and “torture” might allow our government
to tout its adherence to the Convention Against Torture, while simultaneously
abusing prisoners to force them to reveal information. In my innocence, I
could not shake the feeling that only academics whose imaginations are
addicted to worst-case hypotheticals would pursue that sort of logic-chopping.
As it turned out, my imagination was insufficiently bleak. We now know
that by the time I began drafting my article, attorneys in the Justice
Department and Defense Department already had deployed the arguments that
concerned me in support of “torture lite,”3 and that the military and other
government agencies were aggressively turning theory into battlefield doctrine
and technique. Notwithstanding repeated public assurances that American
forces avoided “torture,” obeyed “the law,” and acted “humanely” toward
captured terrorist suspects, lawyers who set governing policy contrived to
generate legal analyses that freed interrogators from legal constraints and
insulated executive branch policy in the so-called Global War on Terrorism
from the common meaning of “torture” and “humane treatment.”4
doubted whether the courts of the United States could be relied upon to apply the doctrine fairly.
See Alan M. Dershowitz, Torture Without Visibility and Accountability Is Worse Than with It,
6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 326 (2003). He has since returned to his advocacy of torture warrants.
See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, Stop Winking at Torture and Codify It, L.A. TIMES, June 13,
2004, at M5.
3. Both popular and national security discussion regularly distinguish between the
category of “torture,” in which physical assaults on the body of the victim result in excruciating
pain, and the category of “torture lite” or “stress and duress” techniques, which involve the
infliction of severe physical or psychological stress by means other than physical assault.
“Torture lite” techniques include depriving subjects of sleep, light, food, or water, subjecting
them to continuous loud noise or bright light, shackling them in excruciating positions, and
depriving them of medical attention. The first published mention of “torture lite” I could find
is Duncan Campbell, U.S. Interrogators Turn to “Torture Lite,” THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 25, 2003,
at 17, but the phrase is presented as a term of art. The first public account of the dimensions of
abusive interrogations in the “Global War on Terror” was Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S.
Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations; “Stress and Duress” Tactics Used on Terrorism
Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at A1.
4. Among the uncomfortable echoes I have uncovered in research for this paper is the
fact that the Argentinian junta’s official name for its “dirty war” was the “War Against Terrorism
and Subversion.” FRANK GRAZIANO, DIVINE VIOLENCE: SPECTACLE, PSYCHO-SEXUALITY &
RADICAL CHRISTIANITY IN THE ARGENTINE “DIRTY WAR” 48 (1992); see also id. at 86-87
(describing Argentinian practices of the use of hoods (capuchas) and painfully loud music as part
of the regular rituals of torture); id. at 111 (“All concerns of ethics, of human rights, of due
process, of constitutional hierarchies, and of division of power were subordinated to this urgent
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I. THE INSULATED CONSCIENCE AT WORK
In January 2002, the Office of Legal Counsel of the Justice Department
(OLC) issued an opinion that prisoners captured during operations in
Afghanistan against the Taliban and al Qaeda fell outside of the protections of
the Geneva Conventions,5 and President Bush issued a “determination” to that
effect.6 The apparent moving force for this determination was revealed in a
letter of February 1, 2002, from Attorney General John Ashcroft, which argued
that the determination would allow the use of “forward leaning” methods of
interrogation, while minimizing “the legal risks of liability, litigation and
criminal prosecution.”7
On August 1, 2002, now-Judge Jay Bybee issued an opinion letter for the
OLC to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales,8 taking an extraordinarily
narrow view of the circumstances under which those who torture captives
could be subject to prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §§2340 and 2340A, the
federal criminal statute implementing some U.S. obligations under the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading

eschatological crusade”; the official combatant is to be a “perfect Crusading Knight for God and
Fatherland”); id. at 123 (“General Menendez remarked that all of the subversive talk about
excessive violence . . . missed the point because the entire problem of subversion and
countersubversion constituted a war.” (emphasis in original)).
5. Memorandum for William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Dept. of Defense, from John
Yoo, Deputy Asst. Atty. General, and Robert J. Delahunty, Spec. Counsel, Application of
Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, Jan. 9, 2002, available at http://www.
gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.09.pdf.
6. See Memorandum for the President from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Decision re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with
Al Qaeda and the Taliban, Jan. 25, 2002, available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB127/02.01.25.pdf, reprinted in MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU
GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON TERROR 83 (2004). In his memorandum, Gonzales referred to some
provisions of the Geneva Conventions as “obsolete” and “quaint.” Id. at 2 (DANNER at 84).
7. Letter to President George W. Bush from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Feb. 1,
2002, available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/020201.pdf, reprinted in DANNER, supra note 6, at 92. The Department of Defense reportedly had already ordered
that military interrogators should “take the gloves off” in interrogating captured Taliban fighters
in late 2001. See Richard Serrano, Prison Interrogators’ Gloves Came Off Before Abu Ghraib,
L.A. TIMES, June 9, 2004. For a summary of Alberto Gonzales’ advocacy of these “forward
leaning” strategies, see Michael Isikoff et al., Torture’s Path, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 27, 2004, at 54.
8. Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, from Jay S. Bybee,
Asst. Atty. General, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A,
Aug. 1, 2002 [hereinafter Bybee Memo], available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB127/02.08.01.pdf, reprinted in DANNER, supra note 6, at 115.
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Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention).9 Under both the convention
and the statute, “torture” involves the intentional infliction of “severe”
physical or mental pain or suffering.10 Relying on a misreading of several
wholly inapplicable statutes relating to public health,11 Bybee concluded that
to qualify as “severe,” pain must rise to “the level that would ordinarily be
associated with a sufficiently serious physical condition or injury such as
death, organ failure, or serious impairment of bodily functions.”12 He

9. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter
Torture Convention]. Article 4 of the Torture Convention, 1465 U.N.T.S. 114, requires each
State Party to “ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law.” The text of the
Torture Convention, with links to the reservations, declarations, and understandings of various
states upon ratification, can be found at Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(n.d.), at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_cat39.htm.
10. Torture Convention, supra note 9, art. 1(1), 1465 U.N.T.S. 113; 18 U.S.C. §2340(1).
11. Bybee Memo, supra note 8, at 5-6 (DANNER at 120).
12. Id. at 6 (DANNER at 120). For good measure, the memorandum takes the position that
the statutory prohibition of torture in 18 U.S.C. §2340A cannot constitutionally be applied to
actions taken under the President’s authority as Commander in Chief. Id. at 33-39 (DANNER at
144-149). But see United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 681-682 (1987) (recognizing “explicit
constitutional authorization for Congress ‘[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation
of the land and naval Forces,’ U.S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 14”) (emphasis in original).
For another bit of definitional transmogrification, see Memorandum for Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff from James T. Hill, General, U.S. Army, Counter-Resistance Techniques,
Oct. 25, 2002 (expressing the belief that the following techniques are “legal and humane”: “use
of stress positions (like standing), for a maximum of four hours”; denial of “non-emergent”
medical care; “deprivation of light and auditory stimuli”; hooding; removal of clothing; “forced
grooming (shaving of facial hair, etc.)”; using “fear of dogs . . . to induce stress”), available at
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.10.25.pdf, reprinted in DANNER,
supra note 6, at 179. General Hill was referring to Memorandum for Commander, Joint Task
Force 170, from Jerald Phifer, Lt. Col, U.S. Army, Request for Approval of Counter-Resistance
Strategies, Oct. 11, 2001, and Diane E. Beaver, Joint Task Force 170, Dept. of Defense, Legal
Brief on Proposed Counter-Resistance Strategies, Oct. 11, 2002 [hereinafter Beaver Memo],
available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.10.11.pdf, reprinted in
DANNER, supra note 6, at 170.
It appears that the August 1, 2002, opinion was withdrawn by OLC chief Jack Goldsmith
in June of 2004, shortly before his resignation. Isikoff, supra note 7 (“In a tense meeting last
June, Jack Goldsmith, then head of the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel, told
Gonzales he was withdrawing the Aug. 1 memo. Goldsmith then resigned – at least partly due
to his discomfort about the memo.”). It has been superseded by a new memorandum.
Memorandum for James B. Comey, Deputy Atty. General, from Daniel Levin, Acting Asst. Atty.
General, Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §2340-2340A, Dec. 30, 2004 [hereinafter
Comey Memo], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/dagmemo.pdf. The Comey Memo
provides a somewhat broader account of the impositions that might qualify as “torture,” but it
asserts that none of the conclusions of prior OLC memoranda regarding the treatment of
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indicated that a single act of kicking a prisoner in the stomach with military
boots while forcing him into a kneeling position would not be “torture” subject
to prosecution.13 Meanwhile, in a remarkable feat of legal construction,
Bybee’s deputy, John C. Yoo, wrote that “interrogation methods that comply
with §2340 would not violate our international obligations under the Torture
Convention,”14 apparently forgetting that Article 16 of the convention also
obliges the United States to “undertake to prevent . . . other acts of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to
torture.”15 An unpublished Justice Department opinion written for the CIA
indicates that these gambits made their debut in the fall of 2001.16
The publicly available legal opinions from the Department of Defense are
a little more careful, but ultimately only marginally less aggressive. The
October 11, 2002, opinion of Army Lt. Col. Diane Beaver analyzed proposals
for the use of interrogation techniques ranging from removal of clothing and

detainees would differ under the standards articulated in the new memorandum. Id. at 2 n.8.
Among the earlier memoranda is apparently one, still classified, in which the CIA was informed
by OLC that particular interrogation practices were permissible. See David Johnston et al.,
Nominee Gave Advice to C.I.A. on Torture Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 29, 2005, at A1.
13. Bybee Memo, supra note 8, at 27 (DANNER at 137-138).
14. Letter to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, from John C. Yoo, Deputy
Asst. Atty. General, Aug. 1, 2002, at 1, available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB127/020801.pdf, reprinted in DANNER, supra note 6, at 108.
15. Torture Convention, supra note 9, art. 16, 1465 U.N.T.S. 116. By contrast, the Bybee
Memo acknowledges the U.S. duty under Article 16 to prevent “cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment,” although under an express reservation entered by the Senate that
obligation extends only to acts that would violate the Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution. See Bybee Memo, supra note 8, at 17 (DANNER at 129); accord,
Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment
of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations, Apr. 4, 2003 [hereinafter Working
Group Report], at 6, 35, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2004/d20040622
doc8.pdf. The reservation in question provides that “the United States considers itself bound
by the obligation under Article 16 to prevent ‘cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment,’ only insofar as [that term] means the cruel, unusual and inhumane treatment or
punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution
of the United States.” Resolution of Advice and Consent to the Ratification of the Convention
Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
¶I(2), 136 CONG. REC. S17491 (Oct. 27, 1990).
16. See John Barry et al., The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 2004, at 26
(describing a Justice Department memo allowing sleep deprivation and “stress factors” so long
as no “severe physical or mental pain” resulted). The Barry article also described a presidential
order empowering the CIA to “set up a series of secret detention facilities outside the United
States, and to question those held in them with unprecedented harshness.” Id. This is probably
to be distinguished from what Seymour Hersh describes as a “special-access program”
authorized to assassinate, kidnap, and harshly interrogate “high-value” al Qaeda suspects.
SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND 16 (2004). But given the secrecy, who knows?
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“forced grooming” to sleep deprivation, threatening with military working
dogs, threats of “death or severely painful consequences for himself or his
loved ones,” exposure to cold water or weather, inducing the “misperception
of asphyxiation,” and “mild noninjurious physical contact.”17 The Beaver
memorandum (unlike the August 1, 2002, Yoo letter) acknowledged that the
United States is bound by the Torture Convention to reject “cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment or punishment,” but only insofar as those acts would
violate the “current standard articulated in the 8th Amendment to the United
States Constitution.”18 The memorandum concluded that the proposed
methods were consistent with that standard so long as the abuses could
“plausibly have been thought necessary . . . to achieve a legitimate
governmental objective” (that is, to obtain information), and force is applied
“in a good faith effort and not maliciously or sadistically for the very purpose
of causing harm.”19
As finally refined on April 4, 2003, by the Working Group on Detainee
Interrogations in the Global War on Terrorism,20 the Defense Department’s
legal position was slightly more restrained. It retained the distinction between
“torture” and “cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.” It concluded that the
statutory prohibition on “torture” interdicted only actions that “cause severe
physical or mental pain or suffering.”21 To be prohibited as torture, physical

17. Beaver Memo, supra note 12 (DANNER at 170). An FBI agent commented in an email
message that one DOD lawyer “worked hard to cwrite [sic] a legal justification for the type of
interrogations they (the Army) want to conduct” at Guantánamo Bay. Legal Issues re:
Guantanamo Bay, Dec. 9, 2002, at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/FBI.121504.
4076.pdf. I suspect that this lawyer was Lt. Col. Beaver. According to my discussions with a
high intelligence official, Beaver was unusual in this regard; operational JAG officers generally
were dismayed and outraged by the efforts to dissolve legal constraints. Other reports similarly
suggest that most military JAGs were dismayed by the prospect of quasi-torture. See generally
BARRY, supra note 16, at 26 (describing reactions of military JAGs to the torture memos).
18. The analysis is still sloppy. The Beaver Memo refers only to the Eighth Amendment,
Beaver Memo, supra note 12, at 2 (DANNER at 171), while the U.S. reservation to the Torture
Convention refers to the Eighth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. See supra note 15.
19. Beaver Memo, supra note 12, at 5 (DANNER at 175).
20. Working Group Report, supra note 15. The Secretary of Defense had withdrawn his
approval of the Beaver techniques, and he convened the Working Group in response to
complaints by JAG officers in January 2003 regarding the pattern of abusive techniques. See
Barry, supra note 16; Dana Priest & Bradley Graham, U.S. Struggled over How Far To Push
Tactics; Documents Show Back-and-Forth on Interrogation Policy, WASH. POST, June 24, 2004,
at A01; Nicole Gaudiano, Memos Shed Light on Prison Treatment; Rumsfeld OK'd, Then
Rescinded, Some Tactics as U.S. Weighed Just How Far It Could Go, AIR FORCE TIMES, July
5, 2004, at 18. The reconsideration was contemporaneous with complaints from FBI agents
regarding interrogation techniques at Guantánamo. See supra note 17.
21. Working Group Report, supra note 15, at 10.

2005]

“TORTURE LITE”

193

suffering must attain a “high level of intensity,” although there is no reference
to organ failure as a benchmark.22 Prohibited mental suffering occurs only
where it results in “prolonged mental harm” and the conduct is undertaken
with the specific intent of bringing about “prolonged mental harm.”23 The
upshot of this fine parsing of statutory obligations seems to be that abuse
which avoids physical pain is permitted so long as it is not “specifically
intended” to result in “prolonged mental harm.” Sleep deprivation, starvation,
sensory deprivation, and sensory bombardment imposed with reckless
disregard for long term consequences on the victim are thus not “torture.”
The Working Group also construed the Torture Convention to prohibit
such “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” as would be prohibited by the
Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment.24 As interpreted by the Working
Group, however, this would preclude only actions that “inflict pain or harm
without a legitimate purpose,” that “inflict pain or injury for malicious or
sadistic reasons,” that “deny the minimal civilized measures of life’s
necessities” (but only where “such denial reflects a deliberate indifference to
health and safety”), or that “apply force and cause injury so severe and so
disproportionate to the legitimate government interest being served that it
amounts to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking
the conscience.”25 The Working Group’s conscience was sufficiently insulated
from shock to approve the application of 26 techniques ad libitum to “unlawful
combatants,” including hooding, mild physical contact, dietary manipulation,
environmental manipulation, and sleep adjustment, and nine more techniques
in limited circumstances, including use of prolonged interrogations, forced
grooming, prolonged standing, physical training, sleep deprivation, removal
of clothing, “face or stomach slap,” and “use of aversions.”26 The report
helpfully appended a 455-cell chart setting forth the advantages and
disadvantages of each technique.27
The Working Group Report omitted some of the more offensive proposals
of the Beaver Memo, and unlike the Bybee Memo it made no mention of
military boots to the stomach. Notwithstanding its relatively restrained tone
and the faux precision of its attached chart, however, the Working Group
Report did not specifically disapprove of any technique. Military lawyers
perceived in the Group’s report “a calculated effort to create an atmosphere of

22. Id.
23. Id. at 11-12.
24. Id. at 6, 67.
25. Id. at 67; see id. at 36-39 (discussing the Supreme Court’s treatment of torture under
the Eight Amendment).
26. Id. at 70 & tbls. 2A, 2B, 3A, 3B.
27. Id. at tbls. 1A to 3B.
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legal ambiguity.”28 Nor did the report revoke any earlier permissions to other
government agencies. The Working Group observed with understated
foresight, “Should information regarding the use of more aggressive interrogation techniques than have been used traditionally by U.S. forces become
public, it . . . may produce an adverse effect on support for the war on
terrorism.”29
Apparently relying on this sort of guidance, interrogations of prisoners at
the Guantánamo naval base, which commenced in January 2002, regularly
featured “torture lite,” including deafening music, blinding lights, threatening
dogs, sensory deprivation, extremes of heat and cold, and excruciating “stress
positions.”30 Interrogation occasionally descended into beating of prisoners
and twisting of thumbs, according to both the testimony of inmates and
recently revealed records of FBI observers.31 At the same time, CIA operatives

28. See Barry, supra note 16; HERSH, supra note 16, at 66.
29. Working Group Report, supra note 15, at 69.
30. See Barry, supra note 16.
Ultimately what was developed at Gitmo was a “72-point matrix for stress and
duress,” which laid out types of coercion and the escalating levels at which they
could be applied. These included the use of harsh heat or cold; withholding
food; hooding for days at a time; naked isolation in cold, dark cells for more than
30 days; and threatening (but not biting) by dogs. It also permitted limited use
of “stress positions” designed to subject detainees to rising levels of pain.
Id. One FBI agent “observed strobe lights in interview rooms” and “heard loud music,” but did
not observe abuse. Memorandum from a Critical Incident Response Group Agent to FBI
Inspection Division, July 13, 2004, at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/FBI.121504.
4499_4501.pdf. Another FBI agent’s account of interrogations at Guantánamo includes a
description of detainees shackled hand and foot in a fetal position on the floor. The agent states
that most detainees were kept in that position for 18 to 24 hours or more and that most had
urinated or defecated on themselves. On one occasion, the agent reported having seen a detainee
left in an unventilated, non-air conditioned room at a temperature “probably well over 100
degrees. The detainee was almost unconscious on the floor, with a pile of hair next to him. He
had apparently been literally pulling his own hair out throughout the night.” Email to Valerie
E. Caproni, Office of General Counsel, FBI, Aug. 2, 2004, at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/
released/FBI.121504.5053.pdf; see also Memorandum re: GTMO Issues for SAC Wiley (n.d.)
(noting loud music, bright lights, sleep deprivation, growling dogs), at http://www.aclu.org/
torturefoia/released/FBI.121504.4585.pdf.
31. See, e.g., David Hicks Alleges Torture, AUSTRALIANPOLITICS.COM, Aug. 5, 2004
(containing affidavit of Australian inmate at Guantánamo alleging beatings during interrogation
and denial of food), at http://www.australianpolitics.com/news/2004/12/04-12-10_hicks.shtml;
Ex-Guantanamo Detainees from Britain Sue Rumsfeld, REUTERS, Oct. 27, 2004 (“The federal
court suit alleges they faced repeated beatings, death threats, interrogation at gunpoint, forced
nakedness, and menacing with unmuzzled dogs, among other mistreatment, during more than
two years at Guantanamo Bay.”), available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines
04/1027-09.htm; Paisley Dodds, Memo: Workers Threatened over Prison Abuse, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Dec. 7, 2004 (discussing the memos from FBI agents expressing misgivings about the
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undertook what might be called “full bodied” torture of suspected terrorists
in secret locations, including denial of pain medication, beatings, sensory
assaults, and “water boarding.”32
The Guantánamo techniques migrated to Iraq, notwithstanding the
Administration’s official position that the Geneva Conventions applied in the
latter venue.33 In a vivid illustration of the reality of slippery slopes, military

treatment of detainees that were released pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act suit filed by
the ACLU); FBI Letter Cites Guantanamo Abuse, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 7, 2004 (describing
a letter from Thomas Harrington, an FBI counterterrorism expert who led a team of investigators
at Guantánamo Bay, to Maj. Gen. Donald J. Ryder, the Army’s chief law enforcement officer.
One female interrogator was reported having “grabbed [a] detainee’s thumbs and bent them
backward and . . . also grabbed his genitals.” A witness reportedly “implied that her treatment
of that detainee was less harsh than her treatment of others by indicating that he had seen her
treatment of other detainees result in detainees curling into a fetal position on the floor and
crying in pain.” In September or October of 2002, FBI agents saw a dog used “in an aggressive
manner to intimidate a detainee,” the letter said. About a month later, agents reportedly saw the
same detainee “after he had been subjected to intense isolation for over three months . . . totally
isolated in a cell that was always flooded with light. By late November, the detainee was
evidencing behavior consistent with extreme psychological trauma . . . talking to nonexistent
people, reported hearing voices (and) crouching in a corner of the cell covered with a sheet.”
In October 2002, another FBI agent saw a detainee “gagged with duct tape that covered much
of his head” because he would not stop chanting from the Quran.), available at http://abcnews.
go.com/International/wireStory?id=307303.
32. See, e.g., Douglas Jehl & Tim Golden, C.I.A. Is Likely To Avoid Charges in Most
Prisoner Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2005, §1, at 6; Dana Priest, CIA Avoids Scrutiny of
Detainee Treatment; Afghan's Death Took Two Years To Come to Light; Agency Says Abuse
Claims Are Probed Fully, Mar. 3, 2005, WASH. POST, at A01; Josh White, Documents Tell of
Brutal Improvisation by GIs; Interrogated General’s Sleeping-Bag Death, CIA’s Use of Secret
Iraqi Squad Are Among Details, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2005, at A01; David Johnston & James
Risen, Aides Say Memo Backed Coercion Already in Use, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2004, §1, at 1.
33. See Dexter Filkins, General Will Trim Inmate Numbers at Iraq Prison, N.Y. TIMES,
May 5, 2004 (reporting that the U.S. commander in charge of military jails in Iraq, Maj. Gen.
Geoffrey D. Miller, who was earlier chief of detentions and interrogations at Guantánamo,
“decided to end the hooding of prisoners, largely because it was too humiliating. But he
defended practices like depriving prisoners of sleep and forcing them into ‘stress positions’ as
legitimate means of interrogation, noting that they are among 50-odd coercive techniques
sometimes used against enemy detainees.”); Don Van Natta Jr., Interrogation Methods in Iraq
Aren’t All Found in Manual, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2004, at A13 (describing techniques including
the use of strobe lights and loud music, shackling prisoners in awkward positions for long hours,
and manipulating the levels of pain medication, a tactic that was reportedly used during the
interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, a member of al Qaeda who was captured in early 2003 in
Pakistan after being wounded by gunshots. “‘We will no longer, in any circumstances, hood any
of the detainees,’ General Miller said. ‘We will no longer use stress positions in any of our
interrogations. And we will not use sleep deprivation in any of our interrogations.’ Exceptions
to any of the new regulations would require his direct approval, he said.”) (emphasis supplied);
Email from On Scene Commander, Baghdad, to M.C. Briese, FBI, May 22, 2004 (noting that
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jailers were directed to “set the conditions” for favorable interrogation in a
fashion that spiraled into the photographically documented activities at Abu
Ghraib.34 At the same time, special forces operators and intelligence teams in
Iraq were busy deploying “full bodied” torture in the search for “high value”
insurgents.35 These initiatives, which can hardly be described as anything
short of “severe,”36 included such techniques as mock executions, electric

FBI agents heard or saw indications of interrogations utilizing “sleep deprivation, stress
positions, loud music”; stating that there was no need to report as “abuse” actions authorized by
“Executive Order,” including “sleep ‘management,’ use of MWDs (Military Working Dogs),
‘stress positions,’ . . . loud music, sensory deprivation through the use of hoods, etc.”; but
concluding that “[w]e will consider as abuse any physical beatings, sexual humiliation or
touching, or other conduct clearly constituting abuse”), at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/
released/FBI.121504.4940_4941.pdf.
34. See HERSH, supra note 16, at 29, quoting from Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th
Military Police Brigade (n.d.) [hereinafter Taguba Report], at 18, available at http://www.gwu.
edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/Taguba%20Report.pdf, reprinted in DANNER, supra note
6, at 279, 294.
35. See HERSH, supra note 16, at 46-48, 60-61 (describing secret military program
encouraging sexual humiliation and physical coercion to gain information about the insurgency).
36. See Final Report of the Independent Panel To Review DOD Detention Operations,
Aug. 24, 2004 [hereinafter Schlesinger Report], available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
Aug2004/d20040824finalreport.pdf, reprinted in DANNER, supra note 6, at 329, 336 (noting five
documented cases of what were delicately referred to as “detainee deaths as a result of abuse by
U.S. personnel during interrogations,” with 23 more under investigation); HERSH, supra note 16,
at 43, 45 (reporting that “[p]eople were beaten to death” and that one Iraqi was “stressed . . . so
bad” that he “passed away”); Arthur Kane, Army Court Documents Detail Fatal Interrogation
Technique, DENVER POST, Dec. 21, 2004, at A20 (describing a detainee “placed in a sleeping
bag and tied with an electrical cord in what the Army referred to as stress positions during a
Nov. 26, 2003, interrogation at the Qaim detention facility northwest of Baghdad. . . . This
particular stress position has been used in the past and had rendered one person unconscious. . . .
Special forces and other individuals previously interrogated the general, leaving him with
‘bruises, contusions, and possibly some fractured ribs . . . .’”); Pamela Hess, Iraq Task Force
Punished for Use of Tasers, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2004 (“Four members of a special task force
in Iraq have been punished for excessive use of force against Iraqi prisoners, and the same group
has issued 10 reprimands for detainee abuse, the Pentagon said. . . . [T]he DIA interrogators saw
a prisoner punched in the face until he needed medical attention, and saw prisoners arrive at the
detention facility with burn marks on their backs and complaining of kidney pain, according to
the memo. . . . I’m advised that it was the unauthorized use of Taser (stun gun). . . . The Navy
Special Warfare Command has two special courts-martial pending (for the death of an Iraqi
prisoner).”); Josh White, U.S. Generals Told of Detainee Abuse Early, Inquiry Finds, WASH.
POST, Dec. 1, 2004 (discussing a report by Col. Stuart A. Herrington of prisoner abuse,
including beatings by members of Task Force 121, “a joint Special Operations and CIA mission
searching for weapons of mass destruction and high-value targets, including Saddam Hussein”);
Press Release, ACLU, Special Ops Task Force Threatened Government Agents Who Saw
Detainee Abuse in Iraq, Dec. 7, 2004 (discussing a June 25, 2004, memo from Vice Admiral
Lowell E. Jacoby, Defense Intelligence Agency, entitled “Alleged Detainee Abuse by TF 62-6,”
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shocks, dislocating limbs, asphyxiation, and the application of lighted
cigarettes to ear canals.37
II. THE RESPONSE TO ABU GHRAIB
Some of these facts came to light in the summer of 2004 with the initial
publication of the pictures of abuses at Abu Ghraib. In the news conference
called in response to that publicity, White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales
reiterated incessantly that the Administration’s policy forbade “torture” and
that the United States intended to “follow its treaty obligations and U.S. law,
both of which prohibit the use of torture.”38 He stated three times, with slight
variations, that “[a]ll interrogation techniques authorized for use against the
Taliban and al Qaeda and in Iraq have been carefully vetted and determined

describing how DIA personnel who complained about abuses were threatened, had their car keys
confiscated and emails monitored, and were ordered “not to talk to anyone in the U.S.” or leave
the base, “even to get a haircut”; how the task force’s officers punched a prisoner in the face “to
the point he needed medical attention,” failed to record the medical treatment, and confiscated
DIA photos of the injuries), available at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=
17156&c=206.
Further reports of detainee abuse apparently will be issued at some point. See Dept. of
Defense, Operational Update Briefing Transcript, Jan. 13, 2005 (“we expect that there will be
further announcements regarding detainee operations involving abuse allegations”), available
at http://198.65.138.161/military/library/news/2005/01/mil-050113-dod01.htm.
37. See, e.g., Email to FBI, Re: TF 6-26 Update, June 25, 2004, at http://www.aclu.org/
torturefoia/released/FBI.121504.4887.pdf (describing “suspicious burns” on prisoners); Memorandum from Vice Admiral L.E. Jacoby, U.S. Navy, Director, DIA, to the Under-Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence, June 25, 2004 [hereinafter Jacoby Memo] (discussing reports of
prisoners with burn marks on their backs, bruises, and kidney pain), at http://www.aclu.org/
torturefoia/released/t2596_0297.pdf; David DeBatto, Whitewashing Torture?, SALON.COM, Dec.
8, 2004, at http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2004/12/08/coverup (describing incidents in
Samarra, Iraq, in June 2003 of “asphyxiation, mock executions, arms being pulled out of
sockets, and lit cigarettes forced into detainee’s ears while they were blindfolded and bound”);
Memo to the FBI Director, June 25, 2004, at http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/
FBI.121504.4910_4912.pdf (discussing potential publicity from the report of a whistleblower
who claimed to have observed beatings, strangulation, and placement of lit cigarettes in
detainees’ ear openings in Iraq); see also Editorial, Disgraced by Silence; When Will the
President Respond to Cascading Allegations of Prisoner Abuse by the Military?, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 2004, at 4 (“Army troops repeatedly beat Afghan prisoners in their custody, ripped off
their toenails, shocked them, and dunked them in cold water, according to recent reports from
a U.N. group.”); Press Release, ACLU, U.S. Marines Engaged in Mock Executions of Iraqi
Juveniles and Other Forms of Abuse, Dec. 14, 2004 (describing accounts of mock executions,
use of electricity, setting hands on fire with alcohol), at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/Safe
andFree.cfm?ID=17206&c=206.
38. Press Briefing by White House Counsel Judge Alberto Gonzales et al., June 22, 2004,
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040622-14.html.
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to not constitute torture under the definition provided by Congress and the
convention against torture, as ratified by the United States.”39 He denied that
“the president . . . authorized, ordered or directed” violations of “the standards
of the torture conventions or the torture statute.”40
Gonzales’s statements traded on definitional manipulation of the sort that
endeared certain lawyers to the principals of Enron. The commitments to obey
“the law” and to avoid “torture” rest on the hidden premise that “the law”
prohibits “torture” but not “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” and that
“the law” tracks the precisely constricted definition of “torture” of the Bybee
Memo and Working Group Report. The denial that the President “authorized,
ordered, or directed” any techniques that meet the narrow definition of
“torture” does not deny that President Bush or any other high official was
deliberately indifferent to, colluded in, or contemplated such actions.41 These
statements are accurate in precisely the same sense that President Clinton’s
claim that he “did not have sex with that woman” was accurate.
Rather than taking responsibility for his evasions, Gonzales attempted to
claim that the Administration was “just following orders,” because the crucial
definition of “torture” is the one purportedly “provided by Congress.”42 Yet
in 2004, the Senate by voice vote adopted Senator Richard Durbin’s
amendment to the pending Department of Defense Authorization Act, which

39. Id.
40. Id. Gonzales declared, “What he has done is ordered a standard of conduct that is
clearly lawful.” Giving some sense of what might come next, he added, “he has not exercised
his Commander-in-Chief override, he has not determined that torture is, in fact, necessary to
protect the national security of this country.” Apparently this refers to the still unwithdrawn
claim in the Working Group Report, supra note 15, at 24, that “[a]ny effort by Congress to
regulate the interrogation of unlawful combatants would violate the Constitution’s sole vesting
of the Commander-in-Chief authority in the President.” Perhaps a claim that the Administration
is “obeying the law” simply means it is doing what the President wants it to do.
41. Nor does it deny that the Administration will consciously deliver suspects into the
hands of nations that will subject them to “full bodied” torture, see, e.g., Steven Grey, US
Accused of “Torture Flights,” SUNDAY TIMES (London), Nov. 14, 2004, at 24 (describing the
use of private jets chartered by U.S. intelligence agencies to ferry suspects to countries that
engage in torture); Dana Priest, Jet Is an Open Secret in Terror War, WASH. POST, Dec. 27,
2004, at A1 (same), or that the Administration will attempt to use information gained through
torture to justify continued incarceration of detainees. See U.S. Uses Evidence Gained by
Torture, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 2, 2004 (citing statements made in federal court by Assoc.
Attorney General Brian Boyle arguing that nothing in the Due Process Clause prevents the use
of evidence obtained from torture by the military’s combatant status review tribunals at
Guantánamo).
42. Lest the point be missed, Gonzales reiterated in the briefing, “The definition of torture
that the administration uses is the definition that Congress has given us. . . . That’s the definition
that Congress has given us.” Press Briefing, supra note 38.
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explicitly provided that “[n]o person in the custody or under the physical
control of the United States shall be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment that is prohibited by the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States.”43 The Administration opposed the amendment, and its
allies in the House amended the bill in conference to substitute a “sense of the
Congress” declaration that the Constitution, laws, treaties, and applicable
guidance and regulations prohibit “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of
foreign prisoners,”44 and an announcement of a policy to “ensure that no
detainee shall be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment that is prohibited by the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.”45
The nomination of Alberto Gonzales to be Attorney General brought a new
round of obfuscatory parsing of legal obligations. On the eve of hearings on
the Gonzales nomination, OLC issued a revised memorandum on torture to
replace the Bybee Memo.46 The new memorandum retained the distinction
between “torture” and “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment,” while
broadening the definition of “torture” from actions which bring pain equivalent
to that accompanying organ failure to actions which bring about “severe”
physical pain or physical suffering that is both intense and of extended
duration.47 While there was no mention of military boots to the stomach, the
new OLC memorandum did observe that neither kickings, clubbings, nor
beatings, if not frequent, extended, and severe, nor incommunicado detention
accompanied by death threats, would meet the “rigorous definition of
torture.”48 In a footnote, OLC expressed the “belief” that notwithstanding
disagreements with the Bybee Memo, no conclusion expressed in any earlier

43. S. 2401, 108th Cong., §1057(b) (2004) (emphasis supplied).
44. Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Appropriation Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub.
L. No. 108-375, §1091(a)(6), 118 Stat. 1811, 2068 (2004). The provision as enacted further
limited this obligation to persons “in the custody or under the physical control of the United
States as a result of armed conflict.” Id. §1091(c). This limitation may serve to exclude
individuals detained outside of war zones by either the CIA or the military.
45. Id. §1091(b)(1). Section 1092 directed that the Secretary of Defense prescribe policies
“intended to ensure” compliance with these policies. Compliance is not required, however, only
an intent to ensure compliance. Section 1093 imposes reporting requirements. The CIA was
subjected to no similar obligations.
46. Comey Memo, supra note 12.
47. Id. at 6-7 (distinguishing torture from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment); id. at
8-12 (defining “severe” pain or suffering). The new opinion also retreated from the claim that
the torture statute could be avoided if the “intent” of the torturer was to accomplish some nontorturous end. Id. at 17. It made no mention of presidential authority to disregard statutory
obligations, although it did not repudiate such authority.
48. Id. at 9-10; see also id. at 15 (gunpoint detention and repeated death threats are not
“torture”).
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opinion on treatment of detainees would be different under the newer
analyses.49
In oral testimony at his confirmation hearings, Gonzales once again sought
to convey the misleading impression that by disavowing “torture,” the Bush
administration renounced cruelty in interrogation, while speaking carefully
enough to retain the option of engaging in “cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment.”50 Subsequent written answers clarified matters somewhat. In one
stark example, Gonzales, speaking for the Administration, took the position
that the Convention Against Torture, as ratified by the Senate, prohibited cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment – as opposed to torture – only where such
conduct was prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment. Since
the Bush administration had concluded that the Fifth Amendment “does not
provide rights for aliens unconnected with the United States who are
overseas,” he asserted, “there is no legal prohibition under the [Convention
Against Torture] on cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment with respect to
aliens overseas.”51 Nonetheless, Gonzales stated that the “Administration also
wants to be in compliance with the relevant substantive constitutional standard
. . . even if such compliance is not legally required,” and that “analysis of
[interrogation] practices” for such compliance is “still underway.”52
Apparently President Bush entirely supports this approach. Given the
option to disavow “loopholes” which permit cruel, inhuman or degrading

49. Id. at 2 n.8.
50. The tropes of obedience to “the law” and disavowal of “torture” (silently defined
narrowly) occurred throughout the hearings. One representative interchange occurred with
Senator Durbin: “SEN. DURBIN: Then let’s go to specific questions. Can U.S. personnel
legally engage in torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment under any circumstances?
MR. GONZALES: Absolutely not. I mean, our policy is we do not engage in torture.”
Transcript: Senate Judiciary Committee Confirmation Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2005
(emphasis supplied).
51. Responses of Alberto R. Gonzales, Nominee to be Attorney General, to the Written
Questions of Senator Dianne Feinstein, Jan. 18, 2005, at 9-10 (on file with the Journal of
National Security Law & Policy). This position is at odds with the conclusion of the Working
Group Report, supra note 15, at 67, that the substantive limits of the Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments define the actions that constitute violations of the CAT. See also Ruth
Wedgwood & R. James Woolsey, Law and Torture, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2004, at A10 (“The
United States noted in a treaty reservation that this safeguard [Article 16 of the Torture
Convention] is to be measured by [the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment bans on abuse
that] shocks the conscience. . . . We are not legally free to choose cruel techniques just because
they fall short of torture.”).
52. Responses of Alberto R. Gonzales, supra note 51.
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treatment in the aftermath of the Gonzales testimony, Bush declined to do so.53
III. SHOCKING THE CONSCIENCE
It seems to be common currency in the thinking of the Bush administration
that “torture” is impermissible, but that some actions which are “cruel,
inhuman or degrading” are permitted. In drawing the line between permissible
and impermissible actions with respect to geographical areas within American
sovereignty, and probably with respect to American citizens overseas, the
Administration seems to acknowledge that its actions are constrained by the
Constitution. Abuses that are unconstitutional are impermissible, even if they
do not constitute “torture” in the peculiar locutions of the current
administration. Moreover, in some more recent analyses, the Administration
seems to admit that even for non-citizens overseas, the United States has
committed itself to refraining from “cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment”
of the sort that would violate the Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment,
although the legal status of that commitment awaits clarification. It is
therefore worth returning to constitutional sources to reflect on the
constitutional constraints on official brutality. The Supreme Court’s decisions
under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments describe an interlocked
set of limits on government cruelty that together provide an account of the
boundaries of legitimate governmental action. Those decisions prohibit abuses
that are shocking to the conscience, even if the abuses are intended to thwart
terrorists.
A. Cruel Punishment – and Common Decency
1. The Protection Against Cruelty
If anything is clear in constitutional law, it is that the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments” bars both “torture” of the sort

53. President Holds Press Conference, Jan. 26, 2005, available at http://www.white
house.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050126-3.html (“Q: Mr. President, I’d like to ask you about
the Gonzales nomination, and specifically, about an issue that came up during it, your views on
torture. You’ve said repeatedly that you do not sanction it, you would never approve it. But
there are some written responses that Judge Gonzales gave to his Senate testimony that have
troubled some people, and specifically, his allusion to the fact that cruel, inhumane, and
degrading treatment of some prisoners is not specifically forbidden so long as it’s conducted by
the CIA and conducted overseas. Is that a loophole that you approve? THE PRESIDENT:
Listen, Al Gonzales reflects our policy, and that is we don’t sanction torture. He will be a great
Attorney General, and I call upon the Senate to confirm him.”).
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nominally abjured by the Bush administration and the imposition of pain and
degradation. The original impetus for the amendment came from the Framers’
repugnance toward the use of torture, which was regarded as incompatible
with the liberties of Englishmen.54 Even for those sentenced to death, the
Court has held for more than a century that “it is safe to affirm that
punishments of torture . . . and all others in the same line of unnecessary
cruelty, are forbidden.”55 The Eighth Amendment precludes “wanton infliction
of physical pain,” even for those convicted of the most heinous of crimes.56

54. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (“the primary concern of the drafters
was to proscribe ‘torture[s]’ and other ‘barbar[ous]’ methods of punishment”) (quoting Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (tracing the
“cruel and unusual” punishment ban to the English Bill of Rights of 1689, which prohibited
punishments “unauthorized by statute and beyond the jurisdiction of the sentencing court”). For
a discussion of the historical background of the American rejection of torture, see infra text
accompanying notes 113-124.
55. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878). The Court has regularly proclaimed that
torture – the infliction of lingering and excruciating pain – is out of bounds, even where capital
punishment is warranted. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (“punishments are cruel
when they involve torture or a lingering death”); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 (quoting Kemmler);
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947) (noting that the “[p]rohibition
against the wanton infliction of pain has come into our law” from the English Bill of Rights);
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 370 (1910) (quoting Kemmler).
56. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002) (holding that shackling in a painful
position at a “hitching post” for an extended time is unconstitutional because “‘[t]he unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the
Eighth Amendment’”) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)); Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31-33 (1993) (declaring that conditions of prison confinement that are
sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering violate the Eighth
Amendment); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1992) (reaffirming, in a case involving
beating by prison guards, the “general requirement” that the Eighth Amendment proscribes
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” or torture, even if no serious physical injury
eventuates); id., 503 U.S. at 26 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“‘Diabolic or inhuman’ punishments
by definition inflict serious injury. That is not to say the injury must be, or always will be,
physical. ‘Many things . . . may cause agony as they occur yet leave no enduring injury. The
state is not free to inflict such pains without cause.”) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted);
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 (holding that denial of medical care for “serious medical needs” that is
likely to result in substantial pain or suffering violates the Eighth Amendment because
“unnecessary suffering is inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency”) (quoting Gregg
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)); cf. O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339 (1892) (Field,
J., dissenting) (“That [cruel and unusual] designation . . . is usually applied to punishments
which inflict torture, such as the rack, the thumb-screw, the iron boot, the stretching of limbs,
and the like, which are attended with acute pain and suffering.”); Weems, 217 U.S. at 372-373
(holding that sentencing a defendant to labor under painful conditions violated the Eighth
Amendment, which was motivated by the Framers’ suspicion that “power might be tempted to
cruelty”).
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For convicted prisoners, the Eighth Amendment bars guards from engaging in
calculated brutality and forbids the state from denying the necessities of a safe
and minimally decent existence.57
Of its own force, the Eighth Amendment applies only to actions that
constitute “punishment.” Nonetheless, despite its professed hesitance to make
the Constitution a “font of tort law,” the Supreme Court has recognized that
the Due Process Clauses impose cognate limits outside of the context of
criminal punishment; due process is “intended to prevent government . . .
‘from abusing [its] power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression.’”58
The Court has enunciated a series of constitutional limits on the capacity of
government to deploy force against individuals. In law enforcement, the
Fourth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, has been held to bar police from employing
excessive force in carrying out arrests even with probable cause,59 or from
engaging in extremely invasive searches for evidence, even with a warrant.60
When the government takes custody of those not convicted of crimes, the Due

To violate the Eighth Amendment, the imposition in question must be the result of either
intent or deliberate indifference. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)
(applying a “deliberate indifference” requirement to the conduct of prison officials accused of
failing to protect an inmate from assaults by other inmates). Infliction of coercive pain is of
course entirely intended in the situations we consider.
57. The Constitution “does not mandate comfortable prisons,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 349 (1981), but neither does it permit inhumane ones, and it is now settled that “the
treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject
to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Helling, 509 U.S. at 31. In its prohibition of “cruel
and unusual punishments,” the Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison officials, who may
not, for example, use excessive physical force against prisoners. See McMillian, 503 U.S. 1. The
Amendment also imposes duties on these officials, who must provide humane conditions of
confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter,
and medical care, and must “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.”
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-527 (1984). See also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834-835;
Helling, 509 U.S. at 31-32; Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 225 (1990); Estelle, 429 U.S.
at 103. Cf. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198-199
(1989).
58. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (quoting Collins v. Harker
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992)).
59. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 387 (1989) (setting forth an objective
reasonableness test for measuring excessive force); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593
(1989) (subjecting a police roadblock to Fourth Amendment requirements); Tennessee v.
Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
60. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
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Process Clauses bar officials from physical assault or denial of minimal
standards of decent treatment.61 Indeed, enforcement of standards of minimum
decency against officials came during the 1990s to represent the largest part
of the civil constitutional caseload of lower federal courts.62
In the last decade, the Court has enunciated general protections against
government cruelty. It has held that due process substantively protects against
physical abuses that “shock the conscience of the court,” even if the abusive
acts are not covered by a specific constitutional constraint. This line of cases
originates in Rochin v. California,63 which arose out of Los Angeles sheriff’s
deputies’ pursuit of a tip that Antonio Rochin had been dealing in narcotics.
The deputies burst into Rochin’s apartment and observed two suspicious
capsules on the night stand beside the bed on which Rochin lay partly
undressed. When Rochin swallowed the capsules, the deputies handcuffed
him and conveyed him to a hospital where, “at the directions of one of the
officers, a doctor forced an emetic solution through a tube into Rochin’s
stomach against his will.” Rochin vomited, producing the suspect capsules.
Over Rochin’s objection, the capsules and the morphine they contained were
introduced into evidence at his subsequent trial.
Justice Frankfurter, writing for six members of the Court, found that this
course of conduct violated the demands of due process, which guarantee
“respect for those personal immunities which . . . are so rooted in the traditions
and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental, or are implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty.”64 Observing that due process requires the

61. In Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 127 (1992), the Court summarized its
holdings:
We have held, for example, that apart from the protection against cruel and
unusual punishment provided by the Eighth Amendment . . . the Due Process
Clause of its own force requires that conditions of confinement satisfy certain
minimal standards for pretrial detainees, see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535
n.16, 545 (1979), for persons in mental institutions, Youngberg v. Romeo, 457
U.S. 307, 315-316 (1982), for convicted felons, Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78,
94-99 (1987), and for persons under arrest, see Revere v. Massachusetts General
Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, 244-245 (1983).
See also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 58 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“a physician who acts
on behalf of the State to provide needed medical attention to a person involuntarily in state
custody (in prison or elsewhere) and prevented from otherwise obtaining it, and who causes
physical harm to such a person by deliberate indifference, violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s
protection against the deprivation of liberty without due process.”).
62. Seth F. Kreimer, Exploring the Dark Matter of Judicial Review: A Constitutional
Census of the 1990s, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 427, 470 (1997) (describing prevalence of
constitutional claims against street-level bureaucrats for abuse of force).
63. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
64. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169 (citations omitted).
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state to “respect certain decencies of civilized conduct,” the opinion declared
of Rochin’s treatment at the hands of the deputies:
This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking into the
privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove
what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach’s contents – this
course of proceeding by agents of government to obtain evidence is
bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are methods too
close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation.65
While the issue before the Court in Rochin was the use of evidence in a
criminal prosecution, it rapidly became clear that the conscience of the Court
turned on the “coercion, violence, or brutality to the person” involved.66 By
the end of the century, Rochin was being cited as a keystone in the
constitutional protection of bodily integrity against arbitrary invasion.67 In
County of Sacramento v. Lewis,68 the Court announced a general approach to
the problem of abuse of force. Relying on Rochin, the Court held that in
circumstances covered by neither the Fourth Amendment nor the Eighth
Amendment, the Due Process Clause bars executive officials “from abusing

65. Id. at 172; see also id. at 173 (“It would be a stultification of the responsibility which
the course of constitutional history has cast upon this Court to hold that in order to convict a
man the police cannot extract by force what is in his mind but can extract what is in his
stomach.”).
66. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 133 (1953); accord Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757 (1966); see also Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287
(1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Because our notions of liberty are inextricably entwined
with our idea of physical freedom and self-determination, the Court has often deemed state
incursions into the body repugnant to the interests protected by the Due Process Clause.”); West,
487 U.S. at 58 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (construing prisoner’s claim as one
premised on substantive due process); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-674 (1977);
Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435 (1957) (deciding that involuntary blood test was not
sufficiently “brutal” or “offensive” to invoke Rochin); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032
(2nd Cir. 1973) (“Rochin v. California . . . must stand for the proposition that, quite apart from
any “specific” of the Bill of Rights, application of undue force by law enforcement officers
deprives a suspect of liberty without due process of law.”).
67. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (recognizing “bodily
integrity” as included in liberty “specially protected” by due process); id. at 777 (Souter, J.,
concurring); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849, 857 (1992) (citing Rochin for
protection of bodily integrity); id. at 915 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(same); id. at 927 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part) (same).
68. 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
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their power or employing it as an instrument of oppression” in a fashion that
“shocks the conscience of the court.”69
2. Cruelty and Interrogation
Rochin grounded its analysis in an analogy to the values of the Self
Incrimination Clause: the state’s assault was “too close to the rack and screw
to permit of constitutional differentiation.”70 Two years ago, in Chavez v.
Martinez,71 the Court returned to the proposition that the powers of
government to inflict injury in the search for information are constrained by
substantive due process.
In Chavez, a plaintiff who had been interrogated for 45 minutes while
screaming in pain and awaiting medical treatment after being shot in the face
by the police, sought damages for violation of his constitutional rights. Chavez
was argued a little over a year after the September 11 attacks, against the
backdrop of the ongoing “war on terror,” just as Secretary Rumsfeld was
privately approving the techniques advocated by the Beaver memorandum.
The federal government’s arguments invited the Court to excuse physically
aggressive interrogation on the basis of the exigencies of law enforcement and
the possibility of ticking bombs.72
69. Id. at 846. In the context of a high speed police chase, the Court held that conduct
lacking an “intent to harm suspects physically” would not “shock the conscience,” although it
left open the scope of “conscience-shocking” conduct in other circumstances. Id. at 854; see
United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 262 (1997) (reversing the dismissal of a civil rights
prosecution of a state judge who sexually assaulted and orally raped litigants and employees,
where the trial court correctly charged that physical assault would violate the Constitution if the
conduct involved “physical force, mental coercion, bodily injury, or emotional damage which
is shocking to one’s conscience.”).
70. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
71. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
72. The Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States as amicus curiae, argued for
“breathing space” needed “for law enforcement to confront imminent threats,” putting before
the Court the picture of police “seeking life-saving information” from a suspect regarding a
“bomb about to explode,” and inviting the Court to approve such measures as “grabbing of the
throat,” pointing a gun at the suspect’s temple, and threatening to “knock [the suspect’s]
remaining teeth out of his mouth if he remained silent.” Chavez, Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 2002 WL 31100916 (U.S.), at *7, *21, *24, *25, and *29;
see id., Reply Brief of the Petitioner, 2002 WL 31655026, at *7 (also invoking the “bomb about
to explode”); see also id., Oral Argument, 2002 WL 31748545, at *34 (“QUESTION: [L]et’s
assume . . . you think he’s going to blow up the World Trade Center. I suppose if . . . we have
. . . this necessity exception, . . . you could beat him with a rubber hose.”).
Both the United States and the petitioner cited Justice Marshall’s dissent in New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 646, 686 (1984), for the proposition that “if a bomb is about to explode . . .
the police are free to interrogate suspects without advising them of their constitutional rights.”
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The Court pointedly declined these invitations. Five of the six opinions
in the case rejected the position that torture or physical abuse to obtain
information relevant to a government investigation is a constitutionally
acceptable law enforcement technique whenever the information is not
introduced at trial.73 In this, they followed established law. Many cases
constitutionally condemning physical abuse in the search for evidence as
violating the minimum requirements of due process have involved the
invalidation of convictions obtained on the basis of extorted confessions.74 But

The United States and the petitioner argued that the police were free to do much more.
73. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 773 (“Our views on the proper scope of the Fifth Amendment’s
Self-Incrimination Clause do not mean that police torture or other abuse that results in a
confession is constitutionally permissible so long as the statements are not used at trial”); id. at
773 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that the law is clear that
“an attempt to obtain an involuntary confession from a prisoner by torturous methods . . . [is the]
type of brutal police conduct [that] constitutes an immediate deprivation of the prisoner’s
constitutionally protected interest in liberty.”); id. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“use of torture or its equivalent in an attempt to induce a statement violates
an individual’s fundamental right to liberty of the person.”); id. at 801 (Ginsburg, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Justice Stevens on “torturous methods” and
characterizing the type of procedure to be avoided: “It is far pleasanter to sit comfortably in the
shade rubbing red pepper into a poor devil’s eyes than to go about in the sun hunting up
evidence.”). Justice Souter, joined by Justice Breyer, was more measured in his comments,
concluding that Justice Stevens had set forth a “serious argument” that the police conduct was
unconstitutionally “outrageous.” Id. at 779. Justice Scalia, who joined Justice Thomas’s
opinion, filed a separate opinion focused on a procedural objection to the outcome in the case.
Id. at 780; cf. McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 41 (2002) (distinguishing “the physical torture
against which the Constitution clearly protects” from de minimus harms, against which it does
not).
74. The first in this line was Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 281-282 (1936), which
involved convictions based on confessions resulting from investigations in which one defendant
was “tied to a tree and whipped,” while two others were “made to strip and they were laid over
chairs and their backs were cut to pieces with a leather strap with buckles on it.” See also
Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 36 (1967) (recounting police chief’s threat to suspect, “If you
don’t tell the truth I am going to kill you,” and an officer’s subsequent firing of rifle next to
suspect’s ear); Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 709-710 (1967) (suspect was arrested without
probable cause, interrogated for nine days, sometimes with little food or sleep); Reck v. Pate,
367 U.S. 433, 435, 439-440 n.3 (1961) (mentally retarded youth who was interrogated
incommunicado for a week, “during which time he was frequently ill, fainted several times,
vomited blood on the floor of the police station and was twice taken to the hospital on a
stretcher”); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558-561 (1954) (sleep-deprived suspect confessed
after being questioned by state psychiatrist who offered to treat suspect’s “acutely painful attack
of sinus”); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 403 (1945) (defendant held naked for three
hours and questioned in hotel room for ten hours); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 149151 (1944) (defendant questioned for 36 straight hours without sleep); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S.
547, 555 (1942) (defendant moved “by night and day to strange towns, [told] of threats of mob
violence, and [questioned] continuously” before giving confession); Lisenba v. California, 314
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solid precedent also supports the further proposition that such physical abuse
itself violates the mandates of the Due Process Clauses. Almost half a century
ago, the Supreme Court upheld the criminal conviction of special police who
physically abused a series of suspects. The police had sought confessions that
would implicate the suspects’ alleged accomplice. The Court reasoned that the
physical abuse itself constituted a deprivation of constitutional rights under
color of law.75
All of the Justices in Chavez accepted the proposition, based in Rochin and
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, that egregious physical abuses in police
questioning that “shock the conscience of the court” would violate the
substantive requirements of the Due Process Clauses.76 The Justices
splintered, however, on whether the actions of Officer Chavez rose (or sank)
to that level of egregiousness. Justices Thomas, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, would have relied on an absence of evidence that
Officer Chavez “acted with a purpose to harm Martinez,” interfered with his
treatment, or “exacerbated [his] injuries or prolonged his stay in the hospital,”
and relied on a legitimate “need to investigate” the circumstances of the
shooting, to conclude that no substantive due process violation had been

U.S. 219, 230 (1941) (defendant held incommunicado, slapped, and allegedly beaten, leaving
both ears swollen); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530, 532-533 (1940) (armed state rangers took
defendant out of jail and into the woods for interrogation where they allegedly whipped him);
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 238-239 (1940) (defendants, black tenant farmers, were
arrested without warrants and questioned in a “protracted” fashion “under circumstances
calculated to break the strongest nerves and the strongest resistance”).
75. Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 101 (1951) (“where police take matters in their
own hands, seize victims, beat and pound them until they confess, there cannot be the slightest
doubt that the police have deprived the victim of a right under the Constitution”); see also
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 793 & n.6 (1966) (holding that police officers who
assaulted, shot, and killed civil rights workers violated due process rights, and quoting Williams
on “beating and pounding until they confess”); supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
As the Court set forth the facts in Williams, 341 U.S. at 98-99, “A rubber hose, a pistol, a
blunt instrument, a sash cord, and other implements were used in the project. One man was
forced to look at a bright light for fifteen minutes; when he was blinded, he was repeatedly hit
with a rubber hose and a sash cord and finally knocked to the floor. Another was knocked from
a chair and hit in the stomach again and again. He was put back in the chair and the procedure
was repeated. One was backed against the wall and jammed in the chest with a club. Each was
beaten, threatened, and unmercifully punished for several hours until he confessed.”
76. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 774 (Thomas, J., for the Court, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
Scalia, J.); id. at 779 (Souter, J., concurring, joined by Breyer, J.); id. at 786 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part, joined by Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ.) (under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the “use of torture or its equivalent in an attempt to induce a statement
violates an individual’s fundamental right to liberty of the person,” citing Rochin).
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alleged.77 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, thought
it equally plain that because “the suspect thought his treatment would be
delayed, and thus his pain and condition worsened, by refusal to answer
questions,” there was a clear constitutional violation; “no reasonable police
officer would believe that the law permitted him to prolong or increase pain
to obtain a statement.”78 Justice Souter, joined by Justice Breyer, filed a brief
and cryptic concurring opinion stating that there was a “serious argument” in
support of that claim, but in an opinion for the Court Justice Souter concluded
that whether the actions amounted to a substantive due process violation
should be resolved on remand.79
Although neither the Self Incrimination Clause nor the Eighth Amendment
applies of its own force to investigatory torture, it is thus clear under current
doctrine that brutal interrogation violates the constraints of substantive due
process if its brutality “shocks the conscience of the court.” This conclusion,
however, simply sets the terms of further discussion. The techniques which
the Bush administration claims are not “torture” fall short of the pain of the
thumbscrew, and only two Justices fully joined Justice Kennedy’s position in
Chavez that “no reasonable police officer would have believed that the law

77. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 775 (Thomas, J., for the Court, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
Scalia, J.).
78. Id. at 796-799 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ.); see also id. at 788 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (concluding that “official interrogation of that character is a classic example of a violation
of a constitutional right “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”); id. at 789 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Stevens, J.) (“A constitutional right is
traduced the moment torture or its close equivalents are brought to bear”); id. at 796 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ.) (“torture or its
equivalent in an attempt to induce a statement violates an individual’s fundamental right to
liberty of the person”); id. at 801 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(reasoning that due process and self-incrimination protections are aligned with the “struggle to
eliminate torture as a governmental practice”).
79. Id. at 779 (Souter, J., for the Court in part, and concurring in part, joined by Breyer,
J.). Justice O’Connor’s position on this issue does not seem to be recorded. As noted, Justice
O’Connor seems to join none of the opinions on this point. Cf. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,
314 n.3 (1985) (O’Connor, J., writing for the Court, taking as a given that a confession
“obtained through overtly or inherently coercive methods” would “raise serious Fifth
Amendment and due process concerns”) (emphasis added).
On remand, the Ninth Circuit was equally abrupt, but more emphatic, holding tersely that
the plaintiff’s claim was viable because “[a] clearly established right, fundamental to ordered
liberty, is freedom from coercive police interrogation.” Martinez v. City of Oxnard, 337 F.3d
1091, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003). The United States filed an unusual amicus brief joining in an effort
to induce the Ninth Circuit to rehear the case en banc, but the court declined to do so. 354 F.3d
1168 (9th Cir. 2004).
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permitted him to prolong or increase pain to obtain a statement.”80 Would the
“cruel, inhuman or degrading” treatment of “torture lite” shock the judicial
conscience? Conversely, will a claim of sufficiently compelling circumstances
assuage brutality’s shock?
B. The Conscience of the Court
1. What’s Wrong with the Rack and Screw?
In sounding the depths of the judicial conscience that finds the “rack and
screw” repugnant, it is worth beginning with the basis for that revulsion.
Torture is alien to our Constitution because it is a cruel assault on the bodily
integrity, the autonomy, and the dignity of the victim.
a. Bodily Integrity
Torture, like most of the “cruel, inhuman or degrading” treatment of
“torture lite,” involves an assault on the body.81 From the early days of the
Republic, security against government deployment of force against the bodies
of the citizenry has been a defining characteristic of the American
constitutional system. Protection against physical assault by the government
is one of the hallmarks of a free people. The Fourth Amendment protects the
“person” against unreasonable searches and seizures; the Fifth Amendment’s
protection of “liberty” against deprivation without due process builds on
Blackstone’s definition of liberty as including personal security.82
This concern for bodily integrity draws force as well from the background
of the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on slavery. Before the Civil War, one of
the differences in American law between slavery and other domestic relations
was precisely that the body of the slave was subject to the master’s
“uncontrolled authority”; physical assault therefore could yield no legal
redress.83 Indeed, an action for battery against the purported master was a
80. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 798 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined
by Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ.).
81. Note that some forms of “stress and duress” involve sensory deprivation, rather than
sensory assaults.
82. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 661 (1977) (“Blackstone catalogued among the
‘absolute rights of individuals’ the right ‘to security from the corporal insults of menaces,
assaults, beating, and wounding’”) (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134).
83. See State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 266 (1829) (recognizing “absolute” authority
of the master over the slave’s body); Commonwealth v. Turner 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 678 (1827)
(sustaining the master’s demurrer to indictment on a charge of beating his slave); see also
ANDREW FEDE, PEOPLE WITHOUT RIGHTS: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE
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standard form of legal suit to establish the freedom of the plaintiff.84 A
constitutional prohibition of slavery brings with it a presumption that the
bodies of human beings under American control are subject to the
“uncontrolled authority” neither of the government nor of any private party.
As Justice O’Connor has observed, “our notions of liberty are inextricably
entwined with our idea of physical freedom and self-determination.”85
b. Pain, Suffering, and Autonomy: The Meaning of Torture
Torture, of course, is not a mere infringement on bodily integrity. It is an
infringement designed to produce pain sufficient to loosen the tongue of its

LAW OF SLAVERY IN THE U.S. SOUTH 3 (1992); ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY & SOCIAL
DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1-5 (1982). The master’s authority did not extend to killing
the slave, and some states by statute prohibited “cruel and unusual” punishments of slaves.
Whipping, however, was the normal mode of punishment on plantations, LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 85-87 (1993), and for antebellum
antislavery forces, “whipping symbolically condensed the evils of tyranny and barbarism.”
MICHAEL MERANZE, LABORATORIES OF VIRTUE 296 (1996).
84. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (dismissing, for want
of diversity jurisdiction, a slave’s suit for battery committed by his master).
85. Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 (1990) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring); see also Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 176 (2003) (reiterating that
“involuntary medical treatment raises questions of clear constitutional importance” under the
Due Process Clause); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (“Liberty specially
protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right[] to . . . bodily integrity . . . .”); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (“It is settled now . . . that the Constitution
places limits on a State’s right to interfere with a person’s most basic decisions about . . . bodily
integrity.”); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992) (holding that due process prevents a
person detained for trial from being forced to take antipsychotic drugs “absent a finding of
overriding justification and a determination of medical appropriateness”); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at
278-279 (a “liberty interest” to refuse “unwanted” medical care may be inferred from prior cases
under the Due Process Clause); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-223 (1990)
(establishing a prisoner’s due process right to be free from forced antipsychotic drug therapy
absent justification); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 710 (1987) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Our Constitution’s promise of due process of law
guarantees” at least compensation for violations of the principle stated by the Nuremberg Military Tribunals “that the ‘voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential . . . to
satisfy moral, ethical, and legal concepts.’” (citation omitted)); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753
(1985) (forbidding invasive surgical search authorized by warrant); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457
U.S. 307, 316 (1982) (recognizing that the Due Process Clause protects a “right to freedom from
bodily restraint” that survives involuntary commitment to state institution for the mentally
retarded); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966) (“The integrity of an individual’s
person is a cherished value of our society.”); Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251
(1891) (refusing court-compelled medical examination of plaintiff upon pretrial application by
defendant).
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victim. Both the Eighth Amendment’s stricture against cruel punishment and
the anti-torture background of the Self Incrimination Clause bespeak hostility
to such a practice. Justice Kennedy in Chavez took the position that “no
reasonable police officer would believe that the law permitted him to prolong
or increase pain to obtain a statement.”86 So, too, in Washington v. Glucksberg
Justice Stevens would have held that “avoiding intolerable pain” was a
virtually indefeasible individual right,87 and Justices O’Connor, Ginsberg, and
Breyer approved the prohibition on assisted suicide at issue in that case only
because state law permitted palliative interventions sufficient to avoid agony.88
This perception is not a new one. Even before the Court applied the Fifth
Amendment’s protections against self incrimination to the states, torture to
obtain criminal convictions was viewed as outside the moral universe
delineated by the Constitution: “The rack and torture chamber may not be
substituted for the witness stand.”89 Likewise, it has been clear for over a
century that one of the core elements of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment is its bar to the imposition of torture or
its equivalent.90 Almost three decades ago the Court concluded in Estelle v.
Gamble that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners can
impose constitutionally impermissible “wanton and unnecessary” pain.91 One
of the examples cited by the Court in Estelle as “cruel and unusual
punishment” was refusal to administer a prescribed pain killer to prisoners
after surgery.92 If there is physical pain that cannot be legitimately inflicted
on prisoners in retaliation even for the most heinous of crimes, the state
similarly may not inflict it on individuals who have not even been

86. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 798 (2003) (Kennedy J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
87. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 745 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgments).
88. Id. at 737 (O’Connor, J., concurring, joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ.) (noting that
a patient “experiencing great pain” is not barred from receiving painkilling medicines that might
hasten death); id. at 791 (Breyer, J., concurring) (observing that the laws under review did not
block a patient from “avoidance of severe physical pain”); see Seth F. Kreimer, The Second Time
as Tragedy: The Assisted Suicide Cases and the Heritage of Roe v. Wade, 24 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 863, 887-901 (1997) (discussing the role of pain in the analysis in Glucksberg).
89. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-286 (1936) (citation omitted).
90. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878) (“punishments of torture . . . are
forbidden by that Amendment”); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890) (reasoning that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits Congress from allowing such punishments as “burning at the stake,
crucifixion, breaking on the wheel, or the like”).
91. 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); cf. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 58 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (construing allegations of prisoner subjected to pain by a doctor’s refusal to perform
surgery as raising a due process claim rather than an Eighth Amendment one).
92. 429 U.S. at 104 n.10.
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prosecuted.93 Although the Court may properly hesitate in imposing
controversial value choices under the rubric of due process, the proposition
that the government is constitutionally constrained from intentionally
imposing agony on its subjects does not appear to raise contentious normative
issues.
Even in a regime of negative constitutional rights, the Court has
recognized that when the government takes custody of an individual and
renders her helpless, it has a duty to assure her physical safety and minimal
human needs.94 Torture and “torture lite” flout this duty. They inflict agony
on the helpless; they are thus at odds with the constitutionally legitimate role
of the state. One of Orwell’s final comments in Nineteen Eighty-Four is,“If
you want a picture of the future, imagine a boot stamping on a human face –
forever.”95 This image repels us precisely because it is the antithesis of the
legitimate relation between the state and those subject to its power.
2. “Justifiable Violations”?
Not every governmental action that results in pain or impinges on bodily
integrity is barred by the Constitution. A state may uncontroversially require
smallpox vaccinations in the midst of a threatened epidemic;96 a prison guard

93. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-322 (1982) (“Persons who have been
involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment . . . than criminals”); Revere
v. Mass. Gen. Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (holding that a person “injured while being
apprehended by police” has due process rights “at least as great” as the Eighth Amendment
rights of a prisoner); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-536 nn.16-17 (1979) (distinguishing
the due process right of a pretrial detainee from the Eighth Amendment right of a sentenced
inmate).
Indeed, in his concurrence in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 469
(1947), Justice Frankfurter viewed this prohibition of willful infliction of great physical cruelty
as part of the due process protection of a “principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Cf. West, 487 U.S. 42 at 58 (Scalia,
J., concurring), discussed supra note 66.
94. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)
(“when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual’s liberty that
it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic
human needs – e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety – it transgresses
the substantive limits on state action”), quoted in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
851 (1998).
95. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 271 (1949).
96. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding state’s mandatory
vaccinations as a valid exercise of police power).
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may concededly use firearms to quell a prison riot;97 a police officer may
unquestionably use appropriate force to subdue a resistant suspect.98 Can the
principles that justify such actions similarly come to constitutionally justify
torture in sufficiently desperate circumstances?
a. Purposeless Restraints?
One formulation of the demands of substantive due process suggests that
it bars “arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints” on liberty.99 So, too,
there is language in Eighth Amendment precedents that the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause bars “unnecessary and wanton” infliction of pain.100 Some
of the abuses held to violate the constitutional protections against official
abuse have been entirely without public justification.101 There is reasoning in
some of the Administration’s legal apologia that suggests that this is the sum
of the constraints they recognize.102 If an American official were to subject a
person to physical agony out of personal spite, or because that person

97. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 326 (1986) (holding that the shooting of a
prisoner in the course of quelling a riot did not violate the Eighth Amendment).
98. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (allowing use of deadly force where
the “officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical
harm, either to the officer or to others”).
99. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), quoted in
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 752 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848-849 (1992) (plurality opinion).
100. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002) (“[T]he unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.”
(quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319)). This standard of “unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain” has been used repeatedly by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
825, 834 (1994); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992) (“The unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain . . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth
Amendment.”); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (“Unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment.”); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981)
(pain “totally without penological justification” is among that pain which is “unnecessary and
wanton”); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173
(1976); cf. Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947) (finding no cruelty
where there was “no purpose to inflict unnecessary pain nor any unnecessary pain involved in
the proposed execution”).
101. See, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997) (vacating dismissal of the civil
rights prosecution of a state judge who sexually assaulted and orally raped litigants and
employees); Hudson, 503 U.S. at 4 (recounting that, while prisoner was in handcuffs and
shackles, one guard punched him in the “mouth, eyes, chest, and stomach” while another “held
the inmate in place and kicked and punched him from behind”); United States v. Price, 383 U.S.
787, 795 (1966) (describing the purposeful release of inmates so they could be murdered).
102. See, e.g., Beaver Memorandum, supra note 12 (DANNER at 176).
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resembles the profile of a “terrorist,” or in order to intimidate a population by
showing the barbarity of which the American government is capable, even the
current administration acknowledges that this would violate the demands of
due process.
Even the most “forward leaning” members of the Bush administration do
not overtly suggest rounding up people who look like terrorists and abusing
them simply in hopes of intimidating future attackers, or subjecting terrorists
in custody to “torture lite” for purpose of revenge. Rather, the argument is that
“torture lite” could be necessary to prevent disaster, or at least to reduce the
probability of successful future terrorist attacks. This purpose is certainly a
legitimate one. Does this mean that a government in search of information
engages not in “purposeless” but “purposeful” deprivations of liberty or
“necessary” imposition of pain and therefore acts constitutionally when it
tortures?
The demands of due process are not so anemic. In the root case, Rochin
v. California, the actions of the police arose not from gratuitous cruelty or
personal spite, but from tangible law enforcement objectives.103 The effort to
seize evidence in order to enforce duly promulgated criminal penalties against
drug possession was eminently reasonable as an instrumental matter; indeed,
once the drugs had been swallowed, no less intrusive alternative could achieve
the objective. Nonetheless, the Court found the deputy sheriffs’ actions to be
unconstitutionally shocking to the judicial conscience. If Rochin is the model,
therefore, the issue cannot simply be whether the cruelty at issue seeks to
achieve a legitimate objective.
b. Balancing?
When protection of liberty contends with vindication of public interest,
due process analysis often adopts a rhetoric of balancing or comparison.104

103. The Court in Sacramento v. Lewis observed that in Rochin, “the case in which we
formulated and first applied the shocks-the-conscience test, it was not the ultimate purpose of
the government actors to harm the plaintiff, but they apparently acted with full appreciation of
what the Court described as the brutality of their acts.” 523 U.S. 833, 849 n.9 (1998). The
Court also reiterated that failure “to provide . . . basic human needs – e.g., food, clothing, shelter,
medical care, and reasonable safety” – to those in government custody “transgresses the
substantive limits on state action set by the . . . Due Process Clause.” Id. at 851 (second ellipsis
in original) (citation omitted). Torture is, of course, the polar opposite of the constitutionally
required “reasonable provisions for the [prisoner’s] welfare.” Id. at 852 n.12.
104. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320-321 (1982) (advocating the
process of weighing “the individual’s interest in liberty against the State’s asserted reasons for
restraining individual liberty,” but determining that “this balancing cannot be left to the
unguided discretion of a judge or jury”); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 767-768
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The presence of a legitimate purpose is not enough to legitimate a severe
imposition unless the weight of the purpose is commensurate to the
imposition.
Such a balancing standard would place constitutional constraints on the
use of torture and “torture lite.” If the magnitude of the interest necessary to
justify an intervention rises with its intrusiveness on bodily autonomy, health,
and safety, surely torture and its cognates lie at the top of the scale. Even the
“stress and duress” techniques of “torture lite” would require quite substantial
justification under an arithmetic balancing test; the mere possibility of
obtaining useful information for the “war on terror” or the suppression of an
insurgency should not be sufficient, even after 9/11. The struggle against
illegal narcotics was viewed as an important public interest, but it was not
adequate to justify pumping Rochin’s stomach; torturing him to reveal the
location of his stash would be equally improper.
Notwithstanding the tendency of some analysts to gravitate toward
“ticking bomb” scenarios (where only the captured terrorist knows the location
of a devastating device about to explode), in real life authorities are likely to
seek information by employing abusive interrogation in situations substantially
less clearcut and compelling. The suspect may be innocent or ignorant, her
information may be of only collateral or speculative value, the device may not

(1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (“Approach calls for a court to assess the relative ‘weights’ or
dignities of the contending interests . . . . When the legislation’s justifying principle, critically
valued, is so far from being commensurate with the individual interest as to be arbitrarily or
pointlessly applied [it will violate due process] . . . .”); Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t of Health,
497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (reasoning that the scope of substantive due process rights is
“determined by balancing [the individual’s] liberty interests against the relevant state interests”
(quoting Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321)); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 236 (1990)
(approving “an accommodation between an inmate’s liberty interest in avoiding the forced
administration of antipsychotic drugs and the State’s interests in providing appropriate medical
treatment to reduce the danger that an inmate suffering from a serious mental disorder represents
to himself or others”); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957) (comparing an
individual’s right “that his person be held inviolable” with “the interests of society in the
scientific determination of intoxication”); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26-27 (1905)
(balancing individual’s liberty interest in being free from fine or imprisonment for not getting
vaccinated against the state’s interest in protecting public health).
In Youngberg, the Court concluded that in a state-run hospital the state had “the
unquestioned duty to provide reasonable safety for all residents and personnel within the
institution. The Court also declared that the state may not restrain residents except when and
to the extent professional judgment deems this necessary to assure such safety or to provide
needed training.” 457 U.S. at 324.
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exist, or alternative sources of information may be available.105 In these cases,
even a cost/benefit analysis of “reasonableness” that allows possible public
gains to justify proportionately uncivilized behavior, if fairly applied, does not
authorize physical abuse simply because there is a risk of substantial public
harm at stake. The requirement must be that the incremental gain in avoiding
harm that can be achieved by abuse be sufficient to justify the harm imposed
on the abused individual. A speculative and minor benefit in the future should
not be said reasonably to justify the real and present imposition of agony on
a real person screaming under the authorities’ ministrations.
On the other hand, as the perceived public dangers increase, if only an
arithmetic balance is required, the constraint on abuse may fade entirely. A
sufficiently large fear of catastrophe could conceivably authorize almost any
plausibly efficacious government action.106 Even a small increase in the
probability of avoiding a nuclear or biological holocaust could be argued to
justify almost any harm to a single individual. The danger, to paraphrase Ivan
Karamazov, is that since almost 3,000 victims of September 11 are dead,
everything is permitted. This, indeed, seems to be the approach adopted by
both the Bybee Memo and the Working Group Report in their analyses of the
“necessity” defense for torturers. Lest I be accused of parody, let me quote the
actual words that recur in each report: “a detainee may possess information
that could enable the United States to prevent attacks that potentially could
equal or surpass the September 11 attacks in their magnitude. Clearly, any
harm that might occur during an interrogation would pale to insignificance
compared to the harm avoided by preventing such an attack, which could take
hundreds or thousands of lives.”107
This approach misreads the nature of the inquiry of substantive due
process. A number of substantive due process cases speak in terms of
“accommodation” of competing interests on the basis of their “weights.” But
that “accommodation” reaches beyond arithmetic proportionality; the
underlying question is whether a particular accommodation is consistent with
the “essence of a scheme of ordered liberty” and the “traditions and conscience

105. On the tendency of real world instances of torture and torture lite in the global war
on terror to diverge from the “ticking bomb”scenario, see Kim Lane Scheppele, Hypothetical
Torture in the “War on Terrorism,” 1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 285 (2005).
106. This was the essence of the analysis in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509
(1951) (overruled in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 394 U.S. 444 (1969)), which accepted the
government’s argument that the magnitude of the harm associated with Communist subversion
justified curtailment of First Amendment rights, even absent a likely or present danger.
107. Bybee Memo, supra note 8, at 41 (DANNER at 151) (emphasis added); Working
Group Report, supra note 15, at 26 (emphasis added).
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of our people.”108 In a nation that finds guidance in the Eighth and Thirteenth
Amendments, torture cannot be justified on grounds of public necessity. The
words of the Eighth Amendment prohibit “cruel and unusual” punishments;
torture is both cruel and unusual today, as it was when the Amendment was
adopted. The judicial gloss on the Eighth Amendment prohibits “wanton and
unnecessary” imposition of pain. In the abstract, one might argue that the pain
of the torture contemplates only “necessary” pain. But the rack and the screw
were viewed as entirely necessary by those who wielded them,109 and slaves
were often whipped not out of spite but out of utilitarian rationality. The
“third degree” was viewed as a necessary means in the war against crime, and
the “torture lite” practiced in the prison camps of Mississippi was viewed as
an appropriate and milder penological alternative to the lash as a way of
controlling obstreperous prisoners.110 The heritage of the Eighth and
Thirteenth Amendments permits none of this.

108. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-326 (1937); see, e.g., Chavez v. Martinez,
538 U.S. 760, 787 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Palko);
Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 847 (same); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 n.3 (2003) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (inquiring into whether the right claimed is “implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty”); Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003) (also stressing concept of “ordered
liberty”). Palko itself, while rejecting the proposition that immunity “from compulsory selfincrimination” was part of the “essence of a scheme of ordered liberty,” went on to observe, “No
doubt there would remain the need to give protection against torture, physical or mental.” 302
U.S. at 325-326.
109. Cf. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF: EUROPE AND ENGLAND IN
THE ANCIEN RÉGIME 16-17 (1977); EDWARD PETERS, TORTURE (expanded ed. 1996); Mrijan
Damaška, The Death of Legal Torture, 87 YALE L.J. 860, 876-877 (1978) (book review)
(describing Continental claims that torture was necessary to prevent crime). One opponent of
the adoption of the Eighth Amendment put the matter as follows: “it is sometimes necessary to
hang a man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having their ears cut off; but are we
in future to be prevented from inflicting these punishments because they are cruel? . . . [U]ntil
we have some security that this will be done, we ought not to be restrained from making
necessary laws by any declaration of this kind.” House of Representatives, Amendments to the
Constitution, 1 Annals of Cong. 782-783 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (Mr. Livermore).
110. See, e.g., Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399, 402, 404, 407, 419 (5th Cir. 1978)
(describing the “coke crate punishment (being forced to stand for a long period of time on a
small wooden box)”; the practice of placing inmates in a 6’ x 6’ cell, known as the “dark hole
cell, naked, without any hygienic materials, bedding, adequate food, or heat”; “stripping inmates
of their clothes, turning the fan on inmates while naked and wet . . . handcuffing inmates to the
fence and to cells for long periods of time”; “Mr. Cook defended the use of the dark hole as a
necessary type of psychological punishment for inmates who are obstreperous, obstinate
violators of penitentiary discipline, and favored that method in preference to inflicting corporal
punishment by the lash.”).
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Rather, the parameters of legitimate governmental action are set by the
Court’s observation in Hudson v. McMillian,111 holding that beating of an
inmate by prison guards violates the Eighth Amendment:
[A]n Eighth Amendment claim is . . . contextual and responsive to
“contemporary standards of decency.” For instance, extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.
Because routine discomfort is “part of the penalty that criminal
offenders pay for their offenses against society, only those
deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth
Amendment violation.”. . . In the excessive force context, society’s
expectations are different. When prison officials maliciously and
sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of
decency always are violated. This is true whether or not significant
injury is evident. Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit
any physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman,
inflicting less than some arbitrary quantity of injury. Such a result
would have been as unacceptable to the drafters of the Eighth
Amendment as it is today.112
c. “Traditions from Which It Broke”
These constitutional constraints on brutality cannot be explained by an
arithmetic proportionality. Rather, they reflect the nature of the society from
which our public tradition arises and which it reciprocally constitutes. In
evaluating accommodations between order and liberty, as Justice Harlan
observed, the Court must have regard for the traditions of our country, both the
“traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it

111. 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
112. Id. at 8-9 (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 13 (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(“Indeed, were we to hold to the contrary, we might place various kinds of state-sponsored
torture and abuse – of the kind ingeniously designed to cause pain but without a telltale
“significant injury” – entirely beyond the pale of the Constitution.”); cf. id. at 26 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“Many things – beating with a rubber truncheon, water torture, electric shock,
incessant noise . . . may cause agony as they occur yet leave no enduring injury. The state is not
free to inflict such pains without cause just so long as it is careful to leave no marks.”). See
generally Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 734-735 (2002) (holding that it was unconstitutional
to shackle an inmate to a hitching post for total of nine hours on two days).
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broke.”113 Those traditions have no place for official torture or cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment.
Though torture was not entirely absent in 15th and 16th century English
practice, it was always exceptional, and the common law by the time of
Blackstone excluded torture for purposes of obtaining information.114 Like
Blackstone, the Framers of the American Constitution viewed torture as a
mechanism associated with the vices of Continental despotism. Thus, Patrick
Henry objected in the Virginia ratifying convention to the absence of a
prohibition on torture:
What has distinguished our ancestors? – That they would not admit of
tortures, or cruel and barbarous punishment. But Congress may
introduce the practice of the civil law, in preference to that of the
common law. They may introduce the practice of France, Spain, and
Germany – of torturing, to extort a confession of the crime. They will
say that they might as well draw examples from those countries as
from Great Britain, and they will tell you that there is such a necessity
of strengthening the arm of government, that they must have a
criminal equity, and extort confession by torture, in order to punish
with still more relentless severity.115
113. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The balance of
which I speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the
traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke.”), quoted in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992); cf. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (“In all
events we think that our laws and traditions in the past half-century are of most relevance
here.”); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997) (beginning due process analysis
“by examining our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices” (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at
849-850, and Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269-279 (1990)));
Glucksberg at 764 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Clashing principles . . . [are] to be
weighed within the history of our values as a people.”).
114. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *325-329; see LANGBEIN, supra note 109,
at 139 (“For the future of common law criminal procedure, the English experiment with torture
left no traces.”); 5 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 184 (1927) (“it is
clear from the works of Fortescue, Smith, and Coke, and from the resolution of the judges in
Felton’s Case, that the use of torture was wholly contrary to the common law.”).
115. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 447-448 (1863); see also id. at 452:
Mr. George Mason replied that the worthy gentleman was mistaken in his
assertion that the bill of rights did not prohibit torture; for that one clause
expressly provided that no man can give evidence against himself; and that the
worthy gentleman must know that, in those countries where torture is used,
evidence was extorted from the criminal himself. Another clause of the bill of
rights provided that no cruel and unusual punishments shall be inflicted;
therefore, torture was included in the prohibition.
See generally WILLIAM PENN, THE EXCELLENT PRIVILEDGE OF LIBERTY AND PROPERTY BEING
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These origins have regularly been cited as constitutive of our constitutional
tradition.116
This rejection of torture as alien to the heritage of English liberty held
sway through the early decades of the Republic;117 when European
governments moved to eliminate official torture in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth century, America applauded.118
The replacement of local justices of the peace with extensive police forces
charged with investigating and suppressing crime in late nineteenth and early
twentieth century America was accompanied by organized physical abuse of
suspects designed to achieve those ends;119 the term “third degree” gained
currency among American police officials during the early twentieth
century.120 “Third degree” brutality by police officials, however, was judged

THE BIRTH-RIGHT OF THE FREE-BORN SUBJECTS OF ENGLAND (Philobiblon Club 1687), at 12 (“In
France, and other nations, . . . if any two villains will but swear against the poor party, his life
is gone; nay, if there be no witness, yet he may be put on the rack, the tortures whereof make
many an innocent person confess himself guilty, and then, with seeming justice, is executed.”).
116. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 170 n.17 (1976) (citing Patrick Henry’s
remarks); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581 n.23 (1961) (same); Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227, 236 n.9 (1940) (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371-373 (1910),
for Henry’s remarks).
117. See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION §1782 (1833) (Self
Incrimination Clause “is of inestimable value. It is well known, that in some countries, not only
are criminals compelled to give evidence against themselves, but are subjected to the rack or
torture in order to procure a confession of guilt.”); Culombe, 367 U.S. at 581 (recognizing the
constitutional status of “a cluster of convictions each expressive, in a different manifestation,
of the basic notion that the terrible engine of the criminal law is not to be used to overreach
individuals who stand helpless against it. Among these are the notions that men are not to be
imprisoned at the unfettered will of their prosecutors, nor subjected to physical brutality by
officials charged with the investigation of crime. . . . This principle, branded into the
consciousness of our civilization by the memory of the secret inquisitions, sometimes practiced
with torture, which were borrowed briefly from the continent during the era of the Star Chamber,
was well known to those who established the American governments.”).
118. For accounts of the Continental abandonment of torture, see LISA SILVERMAN,
TORTURED SUBJECTS: PAIN, TRUTH, AND THE BODY IN EARLY MODERN FRANCE (2001);
MALCOLM EVANS & ROD MORGAN, PREVENTING TORTURE 7-13 (1998); EDWARD PETERS,
TORTURE 73-75, 99-102 (1985); Damaška, supra note 109, at 876-883. For American reactions,
see, e.g., HENRY CHARLES LEA, SUPERSTITION AND FORCE (Barnes & Noble 1996) (1866).
119. See PETERS, supra note 118, at 111-112; Office of Legal Policy, Dep’t of Justice, The
Law of Pretrial Interrogation, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 437, 463 (1989) (observing that as the
“locus of interrogation moved from the courtroom to the stationhouse . . . [t]he use of ‘third
degree’ methods by the police to obtain confessions became common, and persisted as a
widespread practice until at least the 1930s”).
120. Richard Sylvester, A History of the “Sweat Box” and the “Third Degree,” in THE
BLUE AND THE BRASS: AMERICAN POLICING: 1890-1910, at 72-73 (Donald C. Dilworth ed.,
1976); National Comm’n on Law Observance and Enforcement, Pub. No. 11, Report on
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constitutionally anathema by the Supreme Court following the exposure and
condemnation of the practice by such authorities as the American Bar
Association and the Wickersham Commission in the early 1930s.121 That
official rejection was reinforced by the revulsion against torture as
characteristic of America’s totalitarian enemies.122 Thus, American law

Lawlessness in Law Enforcement 20 (1931) [hereinafter Wickersham Comm’n]. Professor
Friedman reports that the term was used as early as 1887. FRIEDMAN, supra note 83, at 501
n.18.
121. Wickersham Comm’n, supra note 120, at 5 (“the practice is shocking in its character
and extent, violative of American traditions and institutions, and not to be tolerated”); see
Emanuel H. Lavine, The Third Degree: A Detailed and Appalling Expose of Police Brutality
(1930) (report of American Bar Ass’n Comm. on Lawless Enforcement of the Law); JEROME H.
SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 61-66
(1993).
Numerous opinions cite the Wickersham Commission report and condemn police use of
third degree methods as unconstitutional. See, e.g., Culombe, 367 U.S. at 571-574 nn.3, 6 & 8
(citing Wickersham Comm’n) (describing the pressure police feel to coerce a confession);
Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 101 (1951) (“Where police take matters in their own
hands, seize victims, beat and pound them until they confess, there cannot be the slightest doubt
that the police have deprived the victim of a right under the Constitution.”); Malinski v. New
York, 324 U.S. 401, 407 (1945) (stating that the coerced confession was one of fear, on the basis
of which the court could not permit a person to stand convicted of a crime); Ashcraft v.
Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 149-150 nn.4-5, 151-152 (1944) (citing Wickersham Comm’n)
(portraying the various intimidation tactics employed by officers in an attempt to get a
confession); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547, 555 (1942) (holding that a prisoner’s confession was
not free and voluntary, but given under duress); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530, 533 (1940)
(citing Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940)) (“Due Process of law . . . commands that
no such practice . . . shall send any accused to his death.”); Chambers, 309 U.S. at 238 n.11, 240
& n.15 (citing Wickersham Comm’n) (asserting that the third degree is often used against the
poor and has caused a general unwillingness to cooperate); see also Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278, 286 (1936) (“It would be difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to the sense
of justice than those taken to procure the confessions of these petitioners.”).
Compare McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 344 (1943) (stating that the requirement
of speedy arraignment seeks to avoid police having to “resort to those reprehensible practices
known as the ‘third degree’ which, though universally rejected as indefensible, still find their
way into use”), with Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 160 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“Interrogation per se is
not, while violence per se is, an outlaw.”)
122. See, e.g., Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 788 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (deploring “the kind of custodial interrogation that was once
employed by the Star Chamber, by ‘the Germans of the 1930’s and early 1940’s,’ and by some
of our own police departments only a few decades ago” (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.
298, 371 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
In Chambers, the Court noted:
Tyrannical governments had immemorially utilized dictatorial criminal
procedure and punishment to make scapegoats of the weak, or of helpless
political, religious, or racial minorities and those who differed, who would not
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enforcement officially renounced third degree techniques three generations
ago.123 By the middle of the twentieth century, the Court could declare:
The argument that without such interrogation it is often impossible to
close the hiatus between suspicion and proof, especially in cases
involving professional criminals, is often pressed in quarters
responsible and not unfeeling. It is the same argument that was once
invoked to support the lash and the rack. . . . The Constitution

conform and who resisted tyranny. . . . The rack, the thumbscrew, the wheel,
solitary confinement, protracted questioning and cross questioning, and other
ingenious forms of entrapment of the helpless or unpopular had left their wake
of mutilated bodies and shattered minds along the way to the cross, the
guillotine, the stake, and the hangman’s noose.
309 U.S. at 236-238. So, too, Justice Blackmun argued in Hudson v. McMillian that the
Constitution prohibits
state-sponsored torture and abuse – of the kind ingeniously designed to cause
pain but without a telltale “significant injury” [such as] lashing prisoners with
leather straps, whipping them with rubber hoses, beating them with naked fists,
shocking them with electric currents, asphyxiating them short of death,
intentionally exposing them to undue heat or cold, or forcibly injecting them
with psychosis-inducing drugs. These techniques, commonly thought to be
practiced only outside this Nation’s borders, are hardly unknown within this
Nation’s prisons.
503 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
One of the counts in the Nuremberg indictment of Gestapo officials detailed official orders
approving the application of “third degree” techniques, including “[a] very simple diet (bread
and water), hard bunk, dark cell, deprivation of sleep, exhaustive drilling, [and] flogging (for
more than 29 strokes a doctor must be consulted)” as a means of obtaining “information of
important facts” regarding subversion. 2 OFFICE OF THE U.S. CHIEF COUNSEL FOR PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY, NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION 295 (1946), available at
http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/Gestapo6.htm; see also PETERS, supra note 118, at 124-125.
One of the defenses raised by Gestapo officers was that such actions were necessary to protect
against Resistance terrorism. 20 TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL: PROCEEDINGS, ONE HUNDRED AND NINETY-SECOND DAY
(1946) (containing testimony of witness Karl Heinz Hoffman: “Third degree was carried out
during interrogations. To explain this I have to point out that the resistance organizations
occupied themselves with the following: First, attacks on German soldiers . . . .”), available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/08-01-46.htm. See generally The Nizkor Project,
at http://www.nizkor.org (providing numerous Nuremberg trial documents).
123. See Richard A. Leo, From Coercion to Deception: The Changing Nature of Police
Interrogation in America, in 18 CRIME, LAW & SOC. CHANGE 35, 49 (1992) (detailing
condemnation of third degree practices by police chiefs during 1940s); President’s Comm’n on
Law Enforcement & Admin. of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 93 (1967)
(“today the third degree is almost nonexistent. . . . [F]ew Americans regret its virtual
abandonment by the police.”).
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proscribes such lawless means irrespective of the end.124

That conclusion is no less true today. In reconciling order and liberty,
American traditions have denounced the use of torture and its cognates not
because such measures are irrational, but because they corrode the core of our
liberty and of our national identity. Even the Bush administration is unwilling
to claim publicly that “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” is consistent
with American values. It maintains that its policy is to treat prisoners
“humanely,” while, with the fine hypocrisy that marks the homage of vice to
virtue, it defines “torture lite” as humane.
IV. CONSCIENCE AND ACTION: THE ROLE OF PUBLIC VALUES
If torture and “torture lite” could be confined to a limited situation in
which they were the only way of preventing vast devastation, there are good

124. Culombe, 367 U.S. at 587-588. Other examples of public policies that predictably
result in the risk of physical harm or pain are entirely distinguishable from interrogational
torture. A military draft subjects citizens to the possibility, not the assurance, of physical
danger, and in any event is governed by the laws of war, which prohibit torture. A prohibition
of the abortion of a viable fetus occupies the body of the woman but does not impose torturous
pain, for the woman can always seek anesthesia, and in any event a threat to the “health of
mother” will justify an abortion. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38-39 (1905),
permitted mandatory smallpox vaccination but assumed that courts would protect a patient if the
vaccination would “seriously impair his health” or result in “cruel or inhuman” impositions.
Mandatory medical procedures have been upheld under due process scrutiny only where they
are in the medical interest of the patient, a situation hardly applicable to interrogational torture.
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-222,
227 (1990).
Deployment of deadly force to prevent flight of a dangerous felon, approved in some
circumstances in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 14 (1985), may be justified by the magnitude
of a contingent threat, by the felon’s defiance of public order, and by the threat that the felon
personally poses to law enforcement and the citizenry. By definition, a suspect under
interrogation poses no similar threat. It is precisely her helplessness that makes the torture
repulsive. Notwithstanding the “importance” of the law enforcement effort, the doctrine of
Tennessee v. Garner would not countenance pistol whipping an apprehended knifepoint mugger
into revealing the whereabouts of an accomplice who had escaped.
It could be that the suspect violates a law by refusing to answer a legitimate grand jury
inquiry, or by giving a misleading answer to law enforcement officials. But Tennessee v. Garner
would not countenance the deployment of lethal force generally either to apprehend fleeing
perjurers or to coerce contumacious witnesses. After appropriate process the recalcitrant suspect
may be incarcerated indefinitely or subjected to heavy fines or imprisonment. But no matter
how important the interest that the state pursues, the punishment for such a fault cannot involve
barbarity precluded by the Eighth Amendment. It would be an odd result, indeed, if the state
were able to impose heavier sanctions without judicial process than those available with it.
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faith arguments that, as a matter of both policy and public ethics, an official
might choose to violate the law and otherwise peremptory moral norms by
ordering such torture. Yet even if torture might at times be an ineluctable
necessity, on other occasions it will wreak human havoc without any
discernible, much less proportionate, public benefit, and sometimes any
possible benefits could be achieved without resort to torture.125 If current
events are any indication, there is every reason to believe that torture or
“torture lite,” if recognized as legitimate, will be deployed frequently in those
latter cases.
In the current “global war on terror,” the most charitable interpretation of
events is that techniques initially approved for use by experienced
interrogators against a few hardened members of al Qaeda migrated in short
order to the repertoire of National Guard members holding thousands of Iraqis
who had annoyed occupying forces. This should come as no surprise. The
tendency of brutality to escalate in prison settings is a well-established
observation of social psychology and political experience.126 Yet even if
physical abuses were limited to a corps of professional “stress and duress
experts” (to use the most antiseptic euphemism I can generate), a legal regime
that allows a sliding scale of justifications for “torture lite” is likely to
encourage such officials to yield to what General Jacques de Bolladiere

125. In 1956, following the deployment of torture in the Battle of Algiers, Paul Teitgen,
the secretary-general of the Algiers prefecture, resisted the pressure of his chief of police to
torture a terrorist who had been apprehended placing a bomb in a gasworks. A second bomb
was allegedly set to explode in the gasworks, potentially triggering an explosion of stored gas
that would endanger the entire city. In fact, no second bomb exploded, and it is not clear
whether such a bomb existed. See EVANS & MORGAN, supra note 118, at 44 n.58. Maître
Teitgen’s resolve was based on the proposition that “if you once get into the torture business,
you’re lost. . . . All our so-called civilization is covered with varnish.” RITA MARAN, TORTURE,
THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN THE FRENCH-ALGERIAN WAR 117-118 (1989).
The argument of General Albano Jorge Harguindeguy in defense of the brutal and
indiscriminate torture of leftists and suspected subversives in Argentina provides an illustration
of the way in which the “ticking bomb” justification can quickly descend into barbarism:
Suppose, Harguindeguy argued, that a terrorist had placed a bomb in an
apartment building and that within ten or twenty minutes the bomb was going to
explode, killing the two hundred Argentines residing there. Was torture not then
justifiable to determine the bomb’s whereabouts in order to save so many lives?
GRAZIANO, supra note 4, at 28.
126. The classic cite is Craig Haney, Curtis Banks & Philip Zimbardo, Interpersonal
Dynamics in a Simulated Prison, 1 INT’L J. CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 69 (1973), available
at http://www.prisonexp.org/pdf/ijcp1973.pdf. See, e.g., Schlesinger Report, supra note 36, at
114-121 (DANNER at 394-399); CHRIS MACKEY, THE INTERROGATORS 471 (2004) (commenting
on the “gravitational laws that govern human behavior when one group of people is given
complete control over another in prison. Every impulse tugs downward.”).
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referred to in the aftermath of the Battle of Algiers as the “mortal temptation
of instantaneous efficacy.”127 The job of interrogators is to get information,
and any method that holds out the hope of achieving that goal quickly and
decisively is far more attractive than an alternative that relies on slower
psychological manipulation or careful cross examination. When the instantly
effective mechanism involves the possibility of inflicting hardship on those
who may be in league with terrorists who have attacked innocent Americans,
the prospect of abuse becomes more attractive still.128
If torture and its cognates are permitted against sufficiently “high value”
targets, it becomes increasingly difficult under pressure for officials to refrain
from deploying those techniques. Those who incline toward abuse will be
encouraged, should they believe the occasion warrants it; those who seek to
resist abuse will lose moral stature. Some officials will tend to view their
legally permitted scope of action as the starting point from which to push the
envelope in pursuit of their appointed task. The wider the scope of legally
permitted action, the wider the resulting expansion of extralegal physical
pressure.129 If torture becomes an officially recognized possibility, a
functionary must be prepared to justify not applying torture. Torture will be
an ever-present option, and there will often be no immediate psychological
cost to exercising that option, for officials will be able to transfer the moral
responsibility for the torture to higher officials.130
Under a clear policy of official prohibition, by contrast, the temptation to
investigative excess is cabined by the bright line rule that physical abuse of
prisoners is impermissible. Most officials will be inclined, by duty or by
morality, to respect the minima of civilized behavior. As long as our law
articulates a norm that says officials have an obligation to act decently, even

127. MARAN, supra note 125, at 117.
128. See MACKEY, supra note 126, at 175 (“Most of the interrogators truly detested the
prisoners they faced . . . and saw them as complicit in the September 11 attacks. Down deep
most of us . . . saw our jobs as an opportunity to exact a small measure of revenge.”); cf.
Dominique de Quervain et al., The Neural Basis of Altruistic Punishment, 305 SCIENCE 1254
(2004) (describing an experiment in which PET scans of the brains of subjects who punished
violators of social norms of fairness revealed activity in the area of the brain activated by the
pleasures of nicotine and cocaine).
129. See, e.g., EVANS & MORGAN, supra note 118, at 55 (quoting “the law of inevitable
increment – whatever powers the police have they will exceed by a given margin”).
130. This is particularly true if the choice is to seek approval by a judge by way of warrant.
Armed with a doctrine that requires them to “balance” the rights of suspects against the needs
of the public, it seems entirely plausible to predict that warrants would issue in cases far short
of the “ticking bomb,” for each warrant granted would be the starting point for an argument that
a subsequent warrant should be granted in circumstances just a little bit short of the exigencies
of the prior case.
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when confronting terror, the official inclined to act with basic decency but
confronted with occupational temptation has a basis to claim that her
inclination to humanity does not cause her to abandon her duty but rather to
fulfill it.131 Thus, for example, the pseudonymous interrogator “Chris
Mackey” reports that in Afghanistan his allegiance to the Geneva Conventions,
whose spirit he understood to govern his conduct, allowed him to set limits to
the abuse of prisoners in interrogation in the face of demands of Army
Rangers.132 And in Iraq, Sergeant Frank “Greg” Ford, a counterintelligence
agent in the California National Guard’s 223rd Military Intelligence Battalion,
was driven to challenge “full bodied” torture of prisoners by a belief that
“[t]here were . . . rules and regulations to follow. . . . You broke the rules, you
paid the price. Period. Everyone knew that simple fact, and everyone
accepted it.”133
In response to pressure from peers or superiors to abuse prisoners, a
conscientious official under a regime of legitimized torture can rely on no such
inflexible norm of civilized behavior. “That’s not a high enough value
detainee” is hardly as powerful a retort to an accusation of being a moral
weakling in the squadroom or midnight safe-house as “we don’t violate the
Geneva Convention” or “we are not Nazis.”134 The temptation to partake of
the righteous joy of “altruistic punishment” cannot be balanced by mere
proceduralism or subtle distinctions. If the prohibition is to be robust, it must
be categorized as a threat to the identity of righteousness. Under a rule of
official prohibition rooted in national identity, a functionary who declines to
abuse a suspect can defend her actions by announcing that she is following the
law.
To the extent that we know about the now-admitted abuses perpetrated in
the current “global war on terror,” it is because of a series of officials who

131. See Kreimer, supra note 62, at 504-505.
132. MACKEY, supra note 126, at 271-289 (“I never wavered in my commitment to the
Conventions”; limiting sleep deprivation of prisoners to the same sleeping patterns undergone
by interrogators); see also id. at 31-32 (describing training in the constraints of the Geneva
Conventions). Once one participant resists, the tendency of others to fall unthinkingly into
abuse is weakened. See STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY 118 (1974) (finding
that resistance to demands to administer electric shock rose sharply when the subject observed
others resisting); see also id. at 105-107 (conflicting authority severely undermines compliant
actions).
133. David DeBatto, Whitewashing Torture, SALON, Dec. 8, 2004, at http://www.salon.
com/news/feature/2004/12/08/coverup/index_np.html. By his report, Sgt. Ford was rewarded
for his efforts to challenge torture by forcible removal from Iraq and an unsuccessful effort to
have him declared insane.
134. MARAN, supra note 125, at 117 (argument of Bolladiere), 114 (order of Bolliadiere
to troops to reject “temptation which totalitarian countries have not resisted”).
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have stood up for humanity. Specialist Joseph Darby, outraged by his
discovery of photographs depicting the abuse at Abu Ghraib, was impelled to
bring the matter to investigation because “[i]t violated everything I personally
believed in and everything I was taught about the rules of war.”135 Master at
Arms William Kimbro, a “dog handler,” as recounted by the dry prose of the
Taguba Report, “knew his duties and refused to participate in improper
interrogation despite significant pressure.”136 General Anthony Taguba put his
career at risk by actively investigating and accounting for the abuse at Abu
Ghraib.137 Members of the JAG Corps resisted the effort to dilute protections
for prisoners, and ultimately they revealed that dilution to the human rights
bar.138 They, and others who courageously resisted temptations or pressure to
traduce common decency, have been strengthened in their resolve by the
conviction that the law stands on the side of humanity. Pettifoggery that seeks
to distinguish between “torture” and “torture lite” saps that strength and
dishonors their courage.
But what, it will be asked, of the victims of terrorist attacks who may die
as a result of the excessively tender consciences of those entrusted with our
security? My reaction is ultimately a profound skepticism that there will be
such victims. In almost every interrogation, humanity and security can be
aligned; torture and “torture lite” are often tempting, gratifying, but counterproductive shortcuts. Apparently, most of the abuse documented at
Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib elicited quite quotidian and marginal
information, and did not involve the direct prevention of catastrophe; indeed,
FBI observers viewed the pattern of abuse as counterproductive. But should
there come a time where an official is truly pressed to the wall and faces a real

135. Josh White, Soldier Who Reported Abuse Testifies, “It Was a Hard Call,” WASH.
POST, Aug. 7, 2004, at A5; Taguba Report, supra note 34, at 50 (DANNER at 325); HERSH, supra
note 16, at 25 (Darby “felt very bad about it and thought it was very wrong.”); Kate Zernike,
Only a Few Spoke Up on Abuse as Many Soldiers Stayed Silent, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2004; see
also HERSH, supra, at 42-43 (describing other officers who filed official complaints of prisoner
abuse).
136. Taguba Report, supra note 34, at 50 (DANNER at 325).
137. HERSH, supra note 16, at 43 (quoting a retired general as commenting, “He’s the guy
who blew the whistle, and the Army will pay the price for his integrity. The leadership does not
like to have people make bad news public.”); see also the objections by FBI and DIA personnel,
supra notes 36-37. The two-page “Info Memo” of the DIA director, Vice Adm. Lowell Jacoby,
is the most significant, because he is the highest-ranking official now known to have complained
about prisoner mistreatment. Jacoby Memo, supra note 37.
138. See HERSH, supra note 16, at 66 (describing “two surprise visits” by senior military
officers from the JAG Corps to Scott Horton, who was chairman of the Committee on
International Human Rights of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. “They
wanted us to challenge the Bush Administration about its standards for detentions and
interrogation,” said Horton.).
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and immediate choice between vast devastation and inhumane brutality, my
estimate is that the official will find the strength to take conscientious action,
notwithstanding the possibility of legal condemnation. That decision would
not be an easy one, nor should it be. Acceptance of the possibility of civil
disobedience is no warrant to abandon the rule of law.139

139. Cf. Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1005, 1009 (2000) (arguing that acknowledging the moral fault of
a tragic decision “keeps the mind of the chooser firmly on the fact that his action is an immoral
action, which it is always wrong to choose. The recognition that one has ‘dirty hands’ is not just
self-indulgence: it has significance for future actions.”); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should
Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1099 (2003)
(“When great calamities (real or perceived) occur, governmental actors tend to do whatever is
necessary to neutralize the threat. Yet . . . it is extremely dangerous to provide for such
eventualities within the framework of the legal system . . . because of the large risks of
contaminating and manipulating that system, and the deleterious message involved in legalizing
such actions.”).
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